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# ZURVANISM AGAIN

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THE scholar concerned with the pre-Islamic religious history of Iran is beset with many difficulties, not the least of which is the great paucity of native sources. Consequently, he frequently must have recourse to India for parallels in the early period, and to Classical, Syriac and Armenian sources for much of his material in Parthian and Sassanian times. Furthermore, the temptation to import whole patterns of religious thought from neighboring religions, and to interpret earlier information from conditions obtaining in Iran at later periods of its history, is at times very strong indeed. With the fragmentary, often contradictory, data about Iranian religions at hand, there is also a tendency to fill in the blanks, and by so doing to create a finished and consistent whole picture of the pre-Islamic religions of Iran. It may be commendable to have a large canvas with bold, sweeping strokes, but when the details are so uncertain one may be understandably cautious in accepting the theories of even such eminent scholars as Herzfeld, Nyberg, and others.

It is not my intention here to survey the work of the Uppsala "school" or the Dumézil "school" in ancient Iranian religions, but before proceeding, one might note a certain *caveat* in regard to both. Given the state of our knowledge mentioned above, it is perhaps too easy in the Iranian field to impose theories or systems of religious speculation on the sparse data and to exclude or disregard information which does not fit, as either belonging to aberrant forms of orthodoxy or to various cults, whose number, incidentally, is ever growing. Granted that the situation was complex and that there probably did exist heresies and special cults, nonetheless to assume from several words, or special usage in rare

texts, the existence of a flourishing sect or school of thought is methodologically dangerous. I feel that Iranian history before the Sassanians is in somewhat the position of the history of Arabia before Muḥammad. In both cases local inscriptions on stone, coins, papyri, and the like, plus archeological discoveries, must be ranked higher than hitherto in assessing the past, including the history of religions. It is in this light, rather than with a phenomenological framework of religion, that I wish to examine briefly several aspects of Sassanian Zurvanism.

## ZURVANISM UNDER THE SASSANIANS

Since the appearance of Zaehner's magistral book on Zurvanism there have been a series of articles or reviews showing the catalytic effect of the tome on scholars in the Iranian field, many of whom were already concerned with this problem. For Zurvanism does represent a problem in the history of the Zoroastrian church, and Iranists have long been studying it. One of the most important historical problems about Zurvanism has been restated recently by J. Duchesne-Guillemin in a review article on Zaehner's book.[1] In broad outline the problem is the discrepancy between the Pahlavi religious books which have survived and the accounts of the religion of Iran given by foreign sources, primarily Greek, Syriac, and Armenian. The former are representative of orthodox Zoroastrianism, with a few exceptions such as the book of Zātspram which show Zurvanite tendencies,[2] while the latter sources, on the whole, speak of Zurvanism. As Duchesne-Guillemin has briefly remarked, there are three proposals to explain the discrepancy; one, championed by Christensen, that the Sassanian religion was Zurvanism which was destroyed by a dualistic reaction in Zoroastrianism after the Muslim conquest. Another proposal was that Zurvanism represented a tendency or only a philosophical movement in Zoroastrianism and could never be considered apart from the official state church. The third proposal, the "middle road" of von Wesendonk and Zaehner, has it that a Toynbeean rhythm of history can be followed in Sassanian re-

[1] J. Duchesne-Guillemin, "Notes on Zervanism," JNES, 15 (1956), 108–112.

[2] Cf. J. Tavadia, Die Mittelpersische Sprache und Literatur der Zarathustrier (Leipzig, 1956), 83–86.

ligious developments. Under the early Sassanian kings, the orthodox had to fight against "Zandīks or Dahrīs, Zurvanite materialists who maintained that the world was eternal in the sense that it developed out of Infinite Time, and who thereby denied the existence of a Creator-God, of rewards and punishments, and of heaven and hell."[3] But Zurvanism, or rather Zurvanite fatalism, prevailed and Āδurbāδ, son of Mahraspand, during the reign of Shāpūr II (309–379) had to reassert Zoroastrian orthodoxy. Under Khusrau I (531–579) the Mazdakites *and* the "modified Zurvanism of Mihr-Narsē and his son, Zurvāndāδ," had to be conquered. This last heresy Zaehner takes to be "the doctrine that Ohrmazd and Ahriman were the sons of the Infinite Zurvān."[4] We will proceed to another possibility in explaining the above mentioned discrepancy in the sources after a brief critique of each of the three views propounded above.

The suggestion of Christensen has much to commend it, and many scholars have rallied to it. In support of it, the Zurvanism of Mihr-Narsē and his son appears convincing, and the Zurvanism of the opponents of the Christian martyrs is also attested.[5] Since there is little evidence to suggest that the Sassanian kings were *not* Zurvanites, then it would seem "that Zurvanism was the royal religion throughout the period" of Sassanian rule.[6] In opposition to this theory, one may wonder at the rarity of names composed with Zurvan, as compared with names having as a part either Mithra or Ohrmizd. The coins of the Sassanian kings and their inscriptions bear no trace of Zurvanism. Although this, as the former, is the *argumentum ex silentio*, it nonetheless must be of some weight, especially as the coins carry the legend *mazdayasna* — "(Ahura) Mazda worshipper." It is difficult to deny the existence of either Zurvanism or "orthodox" Mazdaism under the Sassanians, but where Christensen's theory falters is in his assumption of a complete change to orthodoxy after the Muslin conquest to the exclusion of Zurvanism. For all scholars agree that the religion of the Pahlavi books of the ninth century A.D., and the

[3] R. Zaehner, "Postscript to Zurvān," BSOAS, 17 (1955), 236.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Accepted by M. Boyce, "Some Reflections on Zurvanism," BSOAS, 19 (1957), 305–306.

[6] Ibid., 308.

prevailing form of religion in Iran, among the non-Muslims, was "orthodox" Mazdaism. Dr. Boyce has undertaken to defend this weakness of Christensen in her above-cited article.

She suggests that the regionalism of "the two branches of Zoroastrianism" may explain the post-Islamic situation.

> The Manichaean evidence suggests that in the third century Zurvanism was dominant in the south-west of the Empire, Mazdeism among the Parthians. This gives support to what is an inherent probability, namely that orthodox Zoroastrianism remained strongest in those regions nearest Zoroaster's homeland, and farthest from Babylonian and Greek influences, i.e. in northern and eastern Iran. These regions being remote also from the foreign observers of Sasanian times, it is not surprising that they should have been screened from their notice by the Zurvanites of the west. At the Muslim conquest their position enabled these areas to hold out longest, and to remain the strongholds of the old religion. It would be natural, therefore, for their priests gradually to acquire a new authority over the decimated church, an authority which would in itself, in my opinion, account for a change of doctrine as expressed in official expositions of the faith. It is hardly surprising, however, if in these there was a failure wholly to obliterate the Zurvanite doctrines so long established and powerfully supported. That Zurvanism continued for centuries among groups of 'common persons' is suggested by a passage in Mas'udi.[7]

This view is difficult to accept for the following reasons: 1) If Zurvanism was popular at court, this was surely in the west of the empire, not in the east. 2) The east *did not remain* the stronghold of orthodox Zoroastrianism after the Islamic conquest. Quite the contrary; it was Fārs province which was the center of orthodoxy, and it was in Fārs (or in Baghdād) that the orthodox Pahlavi books were written.[8] 3) Zoroastrians remained strong in the west, in Yazd and Kirman, down to the present day, *not* in the east of Iran, where geographical conditions were even more favorable for preservation of minority religions. These Western Zoroastrians were orthodox, as far as can be determined.[9] 4) The use

[7] Ibid., 308–309.

[8] This is not only proved by the books themselves; cf. E. West in Grundriss der iranischen Philologie II, 91, 100, 103, etc., but also by Muslim writers; cf. B. Spuler, Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit (Wiesbaden, 1952), 191–192. Compare Die Vita des Scheich Abū Ishāq al-Kāzarūnī, ed. F. Meier (Leipzig, 1948), 20–21, 40.

[9] E.g. the Škand-Gumānīk Vičār ed. P. J. de Menasce (Fribourg, 1945).

of the word Zurvan for Brahma in Sogdian Buddhist texts, and the god Zūn in Zabulistan, is matched by the absence of Zurvanite theophoric names on the Parthian ostraca of Nisa or on the Kushan and Hephthalite coins.[10] Still I would place more weight on the occurrences than on absences. 5) The post-Islamic revolts *in Khurasan and Transoxiana* (Bihafrīd, Khurramdīn, Muqanna', etc.) were *not* uprisings of orthodox Zoroastrians (indeed the latter supported the Muslims against their own heretics), and they were hardly Zurvanite inspired, although one might conceivably find some connections in doctrines. These revolts, as far as religious ideas are concerned, were rather syncretic, which is what one would expect in eastern Iran.[11]

In short there seems to me no evidence of a geographical distribution of orthodox Mazdaism as opposed to Zurvanism. So the theory of Christensen that Zurvanism was *the* religion of the Sassanians, which after the Islamic conquest changed to orthodox Mazdaism, would seem to require revision.

The second proposal suggests that Zurvanism was only a philosophical movement or tendency in Zoroastrianism and never represented a separate religion.[12] Arguments in favor of this view have been brought forward by Duchesne-Guillemin.[13] This view has much to commend it, for we do not have any evidence that Zurvanism ever had separate rites, a special priesthood, and different places of worship or gathering, from the "orthodox" followers of Ahura Mazda. On the other hand we are confronted with a wider problem here. What distinguishes a religion, a sect, or a religious tendency or movement in the Sassanian period of history? Is the answer to be given in terms of orthodoxy or orthopraxy? If belief is essential how can one reconcile the Zurvanite position on the nature of the godhead with "orthodox" Mazdaism? The answer is that one cannot; in terms of basic belief Zurvanism

[10] Cf. the Vessantara Jātaka, E. Benveniste (Paris, 1946), in the glossary under '*zrw*'. For the Nisa inscriptions the oral communication of I. M. Djakonov at the 24th International Congress of Orientalists at Munich, September 1957, was far more complete than previous publications. Cf. also O. von Wesendonk, Das Weltbild der Iranier (Munich, 1933), 266–267.

[11] Cf. G. Sadighi, Les mouvements religieux Iraniens (Paris, 1938), 123, 167, 197.

[12] I use here Mazdaism and Zoroastrianism as synonyms.

[13] Cf. his "Notes on Zervanism," JNES, 15 (1956), 108–109, his Ormazd et Ahriman (Paris, 1953), 132–133.

and Mazdaism must be two religions. But in terms of rites and practice they were one. The Mazdakites, as far as we can tell, did not hold any theological or philosophocal beliefs radically different from most Zoroastrians.[13a] But they did have different social beliefs and practices, hence they were heretics deserving of death. Zurvanites, on the other hand, held basic religious beliefs, or so it would seem, incompatible with "orthodox" Mazdaism. But they, as far as we know, held the same social beliefs and ritual practices as the "orthodox" Zoroastrians, hence they were not treated as heretics as were the Mazdakites.

After the Islamic conquest, however, the social order changed and non-Muslims did not participate socially in the ruling Muslim community. Hence doctrine became more important than practice and Zurvanites became heretics, members of a sect. So the Muslim authors of the eleventh and twelfth centuries A.D., such as Shahristānī and al-Baghdādī, were not misled or misinformed.[14] Zurvanism was a sect of the *Majūs* (Zoroastrians) at that time, just as it was not in Sassanian times.

Whether, in the Sassanian period Zurvanism was anything more than a philosophical movement or tendency cannot be demonstrated. Whether it was mixed somehow with other beliefs, indeed other religions, is also uncertain though not improbable. The occurrence of the names Zūn and *'zrw'* in the East Iranian *Kulturkreis* would indicate some Zurvanite relations, but there is not enough evidence at hand to make any valid conclusions. As the matter now stands, until fresh evidence appears, I prefer to adhere to this interpretation of Zurvanism. There is, however, another proposal which should be heard.

The third proposal, "the royal highway to the solution of the riddle," as Duchesne-Guillemin puts it,[15] has been set forth by Zaehner, and seemingly accepted by Duchesne-Guillemin (p. 109 of article cited). Dr. Boyce has criticized this view,[16] and I would like to add that the testimony of the coins (albeit poor sources

[13a] Cf. O. Klima, Mazdak, Geschichte einer sozialen Bewegung im sassanidischen Persien (Prague, 1957). Naturally the sides were not so clearly drawn as presented here, but the basic argument holds.

[14] E.g. Shahristānī in Zaehner's book, 433; Mas'ūdī, ibid., 443.

[15] "Notes on Zervanism," op. cit., 108.

[16] Op. cit., 306–308.

for the history of religions) does not suggest any rhythm or changes in the official state religion *as outwardly professed.* One may raise the question of Mazdak, but I fail to find a fundamental *religious* change in that period, as would be the case with the beliefs of Zurvanism. Mazdak, after all, threatened the social order. Before continuing, however, the theories of the Uppsala school should be mentioned.

Widengren has led the Uppsala school in writing about Zurvan. According to his latest work on the subject,[17] he maintains that Zurvan, the West Iranian "*Hochgott*," is very old (p. 7), and that this old Zurvanism had a real cult of Ahriman (p. 15). The book Artā Vīrāz nāme gives us the eschatology of the Zurvanite warrior circle of Vayu (p. 22). The Magi, the priestly caste of the Median kingdom, were the promoters of Zurvanism, which is nothing more than the pre-Zoroastrian Old Median religion with some additions (pp. 55, 102). The Zurvanite apocalyptic literature is the basis for much of the later gnosis in Manichaeism (p. 31). Zurvanism continued in northwest Iran during Parthian times, and this is where Mani obtained many of his ideas (p. 61). In Anatolia a folk religion, or "*Proteusartigen Zervanismus*" gave certain elements to the Mithra and Anahita cults (p. 62).

Widengren continues to amass evidence for an old and important Zurvanite religion by calling attention to the seemingly theophoric names in Nuzi tablets with Zurvan in them (p. 105). He asserts that the old Persian calendar of Cappadocia was Zurvanite inspired (p. 107). Furthermore, Mithraism developed from Zurvanism, the folk religion of northern Iran (pp. 115, 120), and Iranian influences on Judaism came from the Zurvanite folk religion through Mithraism (p. 133). He reasserts the closeness of Zurvanism and gnosticism (p. 135), and finally proposes that Ardashīr brought the *mobads* of the north together with the *herbads* of the south, with the result that the former won the upper hand and dominated Iran in the Sassanian period (pp. 140–144).

In criticism of this may I first say there is no conclusive evidence for any of this; all is *höchst spekulativisch.* The Nuzi names, which are subject to different readings, cannot be used as

[17] All page citations are from the offprint of his "Stand und Aufgaben der iranischen Religionsgeschichte," Numen (1955).

proof for anything, and the calendar can hardly be called Zurvanite. As for the rest we simply do not know.

As is usually the case all of these theories contain truths, and if we had enough source material we might be able to erect a reasonable structure of what actually existed in Sassanian times. As it is we have fragments and surmises, based upon rumours, and we are obliged to imagine a large pattern into which the various fragments of information can best fit. Such a pattern or theory will be only a working hypothesis, subject to ready change or even discard as new material is brought to bear on the problem.

Speculation on time is probably age old. We find early evidence of Chronos speculation in Greece and traces of concern with time in the Avesta and among the astrologers of Babylonia. On general aspects of time speculation one can hardly speak of major influences one way or the other. Just as the Iranian influences on Greek thought proposed by Goetze have been effectively refuted by Duchesne-Guillemin,[18] in my opinion, so Iranian influences on the Qumran community, and the Iranian origin of the *Erlösungsmysterium* and the *Lehre des vollkommenen Menschen*, must be largely discounted.[19] If we speak of "popular" Zurvanism, *as a sect* like Mithraism with cult, then its roots would probably be found in Mesopotamia in pre-Achaemenid times, having its spread on the Iranian plateau under the world empire of the Achaemenids. If we presume Babylonian (and later Greek) influences on Iran, how did they actually, physically occur? Surely it was through Persian officials or soldiers of the Great Kings stationed in various centers of the empire, or through Mesopotamian merchants. But it must be emphasized that there is no proof of a Zurvanite religion with a cult or a church.

Yet Zurvanism as we know it in Iran is a pessimistic belief, hardly one to spread widely. Like gnosticism it was hardly a popular belief. This kind of time speculation, bereft of myth and cult, is an intellectual or upper class predilection. It represents the thought of sophisticated people rather than of peasants or craftsmen, and Duchesne-Guillemin's statement that the orthodox

[18] Cf. his "Persische Weisheit in Griechischem Gewande?," The Harvard Theological Review, 49 (1956), 115–122.

[19] H. C. Puech in F. L. Cross, The Jung Codex (London, 1955), 76–77.

Zoroastrians had to take account of Zurvanism because it became too popular to be ignored,[20] if accepted should be qualified by popular in court circles, or among the aristocracy. Dr. Boyce's statement above (from Zaehner) that Zurvanism continued for centuries (after the Islamic conquest) among groups of "common persons" can be explained as a misinterpretation of Masʿūdī, whose use of *ʿawāmm* is "laity" as opposed to the clergy, rather than "common persons," and is no proof of the masses holding to Zurvanism.

The foreign reports of Zoroastrianism would notice the Zurvanite features of the beliefs of those with whom the foreigners came in contact — state officials, including mobads and members of the court. This coincides with what we know of the "Zurvanism" among the Sassanian rulers. The Zurvanite rulers and aristocracy of Iran would not be likely to appear liberal to Christians in the empire who held the same faith as the enemies of Iran. Zurvanism then did not have a separate church, yet it may have been more than just a tendency. One can well imagine Zurvanite groups within the Zoroastrian church, especially at the court of the kings.

Why did Zurvanism fade away after the Muslim conquest? It was not because of geographical distribution. The decline and fall of Zurvanism, I think, must be linked with the decline and fall of the Sassanian dynasty and the ruling class. It was just this upper class, the court, the *dihqāns*, and some *mobads*, who converted to Islam to keep their power and to work with the conquerors, and who probably helped to bring into Islam time speculation and other problems so prominent under the ʿAbbasids. But the Dahrīs in Islamic times are not Zurvanites unless all those who were concerned with fate and time under Islam are designated "Zurvanites." This, of course, is nonsense. The Muslim conquest really aided orthodox Zoroastrianism, the faith of the masses in Iran, with the features we know of among the Parsis today, to come to the fore and to dictate the future course of the religion of Ahura Mazda.[21] This is not to discount possible forms "material

[20] Duchesne-Guillemin in "Notes," op. cit., 111.

[21] By "to the fore" I mean "to the attention of outside sources"; rather one should say, "Zurvanism dropped out of the picture."

and ethical" of Zurvanism, but neither would qualify as a religion of the masses.

One must be mindful of the historical circumstances and I think the hypothesis proposed above better fits into the history of Iran than the others. To recapitulate: in Sassanian times we had the official state church, which was an intensely nationalistic one, throughout the whole period. The upper classes and court were partial to Zurvanite beliefs while the masses, on the whole, held to "orthodox Zoroastrianism," with many polytheistic traces from past ages as well as later accretions. There must have been heresies within the church, engendered by contacts with Manichaeans, Christians, or other foreign faiths, as well as purely internal movements. The division within the Sassanian church did not lead to civil or religious wars with the dominance of one, then the other party, but obviously there were strains and tensions within the Iranian national church. To foreigners, however, this must have been much less than the division between orthodox and monophysites in the Byzantine Empire of the sixth century A.D. The Persians, when they fought both monophysites and orthodox in the Byzantine armies, can hardly have cared about the difference among their enemies.

Whether the Zurvanism of the Sassanian court represented the so-called "Istakhr tradition" of the *herbads*, while what came to be known as "orthodox Mazdaism" represented the tradition of the *mobads* of *Shīz* (Ganzak), I cannot say. After the Arab conquest, as one might expect, the "folk" religion of Mazdaism prevailed over that of the court and aristocracy.

It must be stressed again that religion in Iran in the Sassanian period (not to mention other times and places) was far more practices- and rites-centered than it was belief-centered. More than anything else religion meant a way of life, a certain society with its forms and rites. Anyone who reads the Pahlavi books can see the excessive concern for ritual, prohibitions and the like in daily life. This was important for the state church of Sassanian times, not philosophical speculation. Mazdakism represented a threat to the church (and state) not Zurvanism. Perhaps we should rid ourselves of all -isms, including a concept of "Zoroastrianism" when speaking of the religious situation in Sassanian Iran. As

with many Iranian philological problems, one may perhaps say of religious problems in Iran, *non liquet*.

In conclusion, I feel that the separate existence of a Zurvanite religion and church is more the creation of European scholars than a true picture of what existed in Sassanian times. Zurvanism then is a Zoroastrian dilemma, but not more, probably less, than the Mu'tazilites with free will and predestination in Islam, or "time" speculation of some of the Church Fathers.[22]

[22] After writing this in the autumn of 1957 I had the opportunity of discussing some of the problems of this paper with colleagues in Germany. Although some of the statements above might be modified I am convinced the thesis is correct. More material on the fate of the *dihqāns* and *mobads* in Islamic times will be found in my article "Irans kulturelle Wiedergeburt um die Jahrtausendwende," in a forthcoming issue of Der Islam.

# CATULLUS AND THE DI PARENTES

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Lying against the Alpine foothills, the land from which Catullus departed for Rome was the home of many and varied local cults. Inscriptions from the first three centuries of the Empire give laconic testimony to the names of comparatively unknown gods and goddesses or to strange divine epithets which may have been an inheritance of the original Raeti or their Celtic successors who held sway until the Roman conquest. The sphere of religious life revealed in fragmentary form in these monuments was a world removed from that illuminated by the pages of ancient belles lettres; the members of the Roman poetic coteries either exalted the official pantheon or culled less-familiar divine names from the Hellenistic tradition. The reader who expects that an author not native to the city of Rome may shed some light on the religious milieu of his place of origin is therefore fated to an early disappointment.

This is a situation in which Catullus himself is no exception. At those points in his poems where the focus is on gods and their rites, he is prone to ignore the cult life of his own Transpadana and to display his knowledge of the exotic, even *recherché*, divinities of the neoteric literary tradition.[1] As a matter of fact, he is more easily identified as a poet of Cisalpine Gaul when he versifies the scandals of his neighbors than when he extols his gods.

Nevertheless, there is one place in Catullus where Georg Wissowa made the offhand conjecture that the source for a reference is no other than a cult of Verona. The passage in question is at vss. 403–404 of the sixty-fourth poem: *ignaro mater substernens se impia nato / impia non verita est divos scelerare parentes*.[2] He suggests that the *divi parentes* have a connection with a cult of

[1] M. Renard, "L'élément religieux dans les poésies de Catulle," Latomus, 5 (1946), 351–357: Léon Hermann, "Catulle et les cultes exotiques," La nouvelle Clio, 6 (1954), 236–246.

Thanks are due Professors Harry Caplan, James Hutton, and Arthur Darby Nock, who read my manuscript and suggested valuable changes in its wording and documentation.

[2] *Penates* variant of later mss.

Veronese *Di Parentes*, and that these are not identical with the objects of *parentatio* and Roman ancestor worship.[3]

This casual note by Wissowa raises two questions to be considered here. The first, of course, is whether at this point Catullus for once makes mention of a cult of his native province. The second is whether the *Di Parentes* of the Veronese inscriptions are indeed to be regarded as something apart from the universal Roman cult of the dead. The latter supposition was self evident to Wissowa, and so far as I know, nothing has been brought forward either to support or refute this idea, although the opposite point of view is often assumed in the commentaries to the Catullan passage.[4]

The *locus classicus* cited in the commentaries both to this verse and to the Veronese inscriptions is in Cornelia's letter to the Gracchi, quoted by Nepos: *ubi mortua ero, parentabis mihi et invocabis deum parentem.*[5] Such *dei parentes*, i. e., the friendly ancestral spirits, were celebrated during the Parentalia, a calm family festival held in February. They are known from various examples of Latin funeral epigraphy, where they appear side by side with, but are in general differentiated from, the *Di Manes*. These latter are a vaguer collectivity, invoked in the effort to discourage tomb violation, although in actual epigraphical practice the distinction of the two tended to be obscured.[6]

[3] R(eligion und) K(ultus der Römer)[2], 232, n. 9: "Die veronesischen Weihungen *diis parentibus augustis* (C[orpus] I[nscriptionum] L[atinarum], V, 3283, bis 3290), mit denen Catull. 64,404 *divos scelerare parentes* zusammengestellt werden kann, scheinen einem lokalen Kulte anzugehören." Add Dessau, I(nscriptiones) L(atinae) S(electae), 5541 (= CIL, V, 3290); N(otizie degli) S(cavi di Antichità), 1891, p. 16; Epigraphica, 4 (1942), 166.

[4] H. Jordan, "Nachträgliches zu dem Briefe der Cornelia Gracchorum," Hermes, 15 (1880), 530–536; M. Lenchantin de Gubernatis, Il Libro di Catullo Veronese (Turin, 1928), 187; Robinson Ellis, A Commentary on Catullus[2] (Oxford, 1889), 344. Dessau, ILS, 7999, n. 1, recognizes that the *Di Parentes* of Verona are different from those of the funerary inscriptions. Theodor Mommsen, CIL, V, places these among the votive rather than the funerary inscriptions of Verona.

[5] Nepos frg. 23, ed. Halm. Carl Nipperdey, Opuscula (Berlin, 1877), 116 f., gives other examples of the masculine gender used for a female divinity, to denote the divine entity, rather than the sex of the particular goddess. Festus 230M, 290Th (Lindsay [Leipzig, 1933], 260): *si parentem puer verberit, ast olle plorassit paren<s>, puer divis parentum sacer esto*, must rather be considered as an injunction against incurring the wrath of the family's gods, according to the contrast between *di parentes* and *di parentum* drawn by Hendrik Wagenvoort, Studies in Roman Literature, Culture, and Religion (Leiden, 1956), 290–295.

[6] CIL, VI, 9659 = ILS, 7519 = Bücheler C(armina) L(atina) E(pigraphica),

All the inscribed monuments to *di parentes*, with the exception of those at Verona, are clearly burial stones. The legends of the inscriptions characteristically consist of a eulogy or lament for the deceased or simply of a dedication of the burial place.[7] Among the funerary inscriptions, by the way, can be discerned the distinction drawn by Hendrik Wagenvoort between *di parentes*, who are the deified ancestors, and *di parentum*, the gods worshipped by the family.[8] The dedications to the latter are acts of piety not exclusively to the parents of the donor, but appear in other dedications: from a freedman to his patron and from a mother to her son.[9]

The inscriptions at Verona, on the other hand, are apt to confuse anyone who persists in trying to associate them with what is known about the rôle of the Roman *di parentes*. There is no dedication here to the *di parentes* of any particular person, nor any association with the *Di Manes*, nor indeed anything of the definitely sepulchral nature of the monuments found elsewhere. On the contrary, three have the legend: *v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) m(erito)*, the regular formula to show that the monument was donated in fulfillment of a promise to a divinity in return for a favor received.[10] Another more specifically records the health or safety of a dear one as the motive of the dedication.[11]

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1583: *Diis parentibus / suis hunc lapidem posuit / . . . Diis Manibus sacrum. / Homo, violare noli, si te / moriturum putas*; CIL, X, 5495 = CLE, 376: *. . . et dignos coleret manesque patresque*; Wissowa, RK², 239; ARW (= Archiv für Religionswissenschaft), 7 (1904), 44; Höfer, Roscher's Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie, III, 1579 f.

[7] CIL, VI, 29109 = ILS, 8047; CIL, VI, 29852a = NS, 1876, p. 58, found in a burial area; ILS, 1078 = NS, 1890, p. 36: *dis genitoribus*.

[8] Loc. cit. (n. 5 supra).

[9] CIL, X, 4255 = ILS, 7999: *. . . deis inferum parentum / sacrum. Ni violato / . . . Philargurus l(ibertus) et socius*; CIL, VI, 29109: *Dis parentium / et Genio Vituli / fecit mater f(ilio) pi(i)ssimo*.

[10] CIL, V, 3287, 3289; NS, 1891, p. 16.

[11] CIL, V, 3283: *Dis Parenti/bus pro / salute C. C. / Ummidi C. V.* / [ . . . ]. *Pro-salute* offerings were made both before and after the granting of a favor. CIL, V, 788 is clearly a thanks offering. J. Toutain in Daremberg-Saglio, Dictionnaire des Antiquités, V, 973, cites CIL, V, 6873, 6875, *pro itu et reditu*, at the top of the Pennine pass, as vows paid in anticipation of the safe completion of the journey, although the *v.s.l.m.* concluding these inscriptions implies that getting back to this half-way point is all that the dedicants had bargained for. A. D. Nock, American Journal of Archaeology, 62 (1958), 339 f., cites Jewish and Christian uses of *pro salute* and *hypèr soterías* where future benefit or salvation is anticipated by the dedicant.

This implied invitation to the dead ancestors to participate in the solution of human problems is strange; not only is it practically unexampled among all other known Latin sepulchral monuments, but it runs counter to what is known of the Roman attitude toward the dead. The primary concern of a Roman was to secure a permanent, inviolate home for the family spirits. Inscriptions show that he expected such an abode and the attendant rites for himself when his own time came.[12] Offerings of food and flowers were made at fixed occasions during the year in accordance with the final, inscribed injunctions by the deceased. Except when homeless spirits, the *Lemures*, were abroad during the three anxious days of the Lemuria in May, it was expected and desired that the dead stay away from the homes of the living.[13]

The Veronese *Di Parentes* cannot have been the same as these spirits of the dead. To look upon their ex-voto dedications as the obsequies normally paid to the departed would be attributing to the inhabitants of Verona an attitude radically different from that of the rest of the Roman world.[14] Consequently these local *Di Parentes* must be regarded as the gods of a unique local cult. Only thus would the solicitation of favors and the payment of vows be normal. Thus regarded, the *Dii Parentes Augusti* who receive a portico at Verona [15] are not the *di parentes* of the imperial household but are to be viewed in the same light as many other deities

[12] CIL, VI, 10248 = ILS, 8366; CIL, VI, 10239.

[13] Ovid, Fasti, 2.33 f., 2.533–566, 5.421–492, 5.443: *Manes exite paterni*; J. G. Frazer, The Fasti of Ovid (London, 1929), II, 431–438, IV, 36–40; RK$^2$, 232–240. Silvio Ferri, "Osservazioni archeologico-antiquarie al *carmen in Lemures*," Studi in onore di Ugo Enrico Paoli (Florence, 1956), 289–292, ingeniously changes the word order to *Manes paterni exite*, to form what he considers to be the iambic-dimeter-catalectic original of an authentic ritual formula quoted by Ovid. His exposition, however, involves a confusion of the Lemuria and the Parentalia. H. J. Rose, University of California Publications in Classical Philology, 12, no. 6 (1941), 89–94, points out that it was not the *di parentes* who were expelled during the Lemuria, but the homeless and dangerous *lemures*; that therefore in the formula used by Ovid the word *paterni*, at least, was an error either of the poet or his source.

[14] Two exceptions to this generalization are in epitaphs cited by Arthur Darby Nock, "Deification and Julian," Journal of Roman Studies, 47 (1957), 121, nn. 44, 45. These, however, are without the votive formula to imply a *quid pro quo*.

[15] CIL, V, 3290 = ILS, 5441: *Diis / Parentibus / Augustis / porticum dedit / L. Iunius M. f. Pauper.* H. Jordan, Hermes, 15 (1880), 531, takes these to be the household gods of the Augusti.

to whom is given the magnifying title of *Augustus*,[16] to bring the Emperor under the protection of the god designated.[17]

It is unsound to base the identification of divine names on their chance similarity to names or words which occur elsewhere in Latin. The plural *Martes* who appear once in Verona are in all probability unrelated to the Roman Mars, but are a name applied to local or personal deities.[18] It is known from iconography that the names of the Celto-Germanic *Iunones*, *Dominae*, *Matronae*, and *Matres* were borrowed as appellations appropriate to non-Roman feminine triads of the Western provinces.[19] The Germanic etymology resulting in the misleading name of the *Di Veteres* can be traced by means of other inscriptions in the German provvinces, where older spellings (e. g., *Vitiris*, *Vitris*, *Hvitiris*) of this name are given.[20] As in the last case mentioned, the name of the *Di Parentes* could be an orthographic development of the name of a pre-existing divine collectivity at Verona; or, as in the former examples, it could be a borrowing from Latin to describe a salient characteristic of these gods. Whichever the case may be, the *Di Parentes* here are gods, not ghosts.

It is another thing, however, to determine whether Catullus was thinking of these gods when he composed the concluding lines to his sixty-fourth poem.

Despite the demonstrably prominent position which the exotic occupied in his poetic pantheon, there are nevertheless two places among his poems where some sort of case can be made for the supposition that he referred to the homelier local cults, and these have an indirect bearing on the passage under consideration. One of these passages occurs at the opening of the thirty-first poem, a

[16] Local deities of Cisalpine Gaul bearing the title *Augustus*: CIL, V, 748, 749, 753, to *Apollo Belenus Augustus*; 818–833, 8244, 8245, Ettore Pais, CIL Supplementa Italica (Atti della R. Accademia dei Lincei, 4th s., 5[1888]), 168, to *Silvanus Augustus*, at Aquileia, where the cult had unique features; CIL, V, 3220, to *Deus Augustus*; 8217, Inscriptiones Italiae, X, fasc. 1, no. 662, to *Melesocus Augustus*, known only in Istria.

[17] Arthur Darby Nock, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 45 (1925), 92 f., 48 (1928), 41 f.

[18] CIL, V, 3262; Georg Wissowa, ARW, 19 (1918), 45, n. 4.

[19] Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, R(eal-)E(ncyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft), s. v.

[20] Keune, Roscher's Lexikon, VI, 350–354; F. Haverfield, Archaeologia Aeliana, 3rd s., 15 (1918), 22–43.

tribute to his home on the promontory at the lower end of Lake Garda: *Paene insularum, Sirmio, insularumque / ocelle, quascumque in liquentibus stagnis / marique vasto fert uterque Neptunus.* Identifications for these two Neptunes have long been current. One is the Graeco-Roman god of the sea, familiar from mythology. The other is presumed to be a fresh-water god of springs and lakes, a type native to the Italic and Celtic religions.[21] All but a few of the inscribed dedications to Neptune in the Latin West are found remote from the maritime areas; and the majority of those in Italy, if we exclude the urban inscriptions, are found in the North, especially about the lakes of Cisalpine Gaul. Here the god's popularity may at least in part be attributed to his identification with Celtic or other pre-Roman deities of the waters.[22] It is with these lake-district Neptunes, some of whose dedications are couched in unfamiliar terms, that the second Neptune of the Catullan verse invites comparison.[23]

This suggestion has its attractions, since one would expect that a native Neptune would be associated with the poet's home. Still, it is not impossible for Neptune, or Poseidon, to have been named merely as the poetic equivalent of *aqua*. There is also the rather abstruse Greek tradition of a fresh-water Poseidon to be placed in the balance against the Italo-Celtic Neptune.[24] Although the existence of this latter aspect of the Greek divinity does not automatically invalidate Delatte's hypothesis that the god of the thirty-first poem is the god of the local inscriptions, it still should

[21] Wilhelm Kroll, Catull[2] (Leipzig, 1929), ad locum; L. Delatte, "Uterque Neptunus," L'Antiquité Classique, 4 (1935), 45–47. Earlier editors, notably Baehrens, hold that this is a reference to Neptune as god of the Eastern and Western seas.

[22] J. Toutain, Les cultes païens dans l'Empire romain (Paris, 1907–1920), I, 372–380; St. Weinstock RE, XVI, 2533–2535; RK[2], 228.

[23] L. Delatte, loc. cit. (n. 21 supra); CIL, V, 4285, to Neptune and *Vires*, at Brescia (cf. 5648, to *Lymfae* and *Vires*, near Milan); 5258, to Neptune and *Di Aquatiles, pro . . . incolumit(ate)*, Como (cf. III, 1562, to *di et numina aquarum* from dedicants *incolumes reversi*, in Dacia); other dedications to Neptune in the Transpadana: V, 4874, 7457, 6565, 7850.

[24] W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and their Gods (London, 1950), 95 f.; E. G. Meyer, Roscher's Lexikon, III, 2818–2820; Ernst Wüst, RE, XXII, 491 f. Among the ancient references are Schol. Pindar, P. 4.246 and Servius, Georg., 1.12, on Poseidon Petraios; Apollodorus, 1.4.8, Poseidon drying up a spring; Pausanias, 3.21.5, a lake of Poseidon in Aegeae; Pausanias, 2.20.5, 2.15.5, Poseidon's control of the river Cephissus.

carry some weight, in the light of Catullus' known exotic tendencies.

The second passage which seems to point to a local religious tradition is found at the beginning of the seventeenth poem. Here, however, the interpretation is hampered by uncertain readings. The poem is framed as an apostrophe to a Transpadane town which Catullus addresses as Colonia.[25] The town has a long bridge, from which the poet would like to see one of his townsmen, an old cuckold, tossed into the swamp. This elicits an attractive — though not necessary — reminiscence of the *sexagenarii de ponte*.[26] The town would like to have games or pranks [27] on its bridge, but fears that its wobbly pilings may collapse. Catullus prays that he may be treated to the spectacle of seeing his townsman get his just deserts, and that Colonia may have a bridge on which certain rites can be performed. This latter wish, as it appears in Schuster's Teubner text, reads: *sic tibi bonus ex tua pons libidine fiat, / in quo vel S a l i s u b s i l i sacra suscipiantur*. This is the sole mention, if the text is here correctly emended, of the rites of Salisubsil(i)us, who is presumed by commentators to be a Mars celebrated by the leaping Salian priests. Other readings render such meanings as "where rites may be begun by the Salisubsili," a name for the local Salian sodality; or "where the rites, 'leap, leap up,' may be performed." [28]

The trouble with the Salian interpretation of this passage is that in itself it is only one of the two rather shaky authorities for the view that the Salii performed their dance on the Roman *pons sublicius*, as has been assumed by some religious historians, or on any bridge, for that matter.[29] Nor is it certain that Catullus

[25] For attempts to identify Colonia, cf. Kroll on C., 17.1.

[26] Th. Birt, *"Pontifex* und *Sexagenarii de Ponte,"* Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, 2nd s., 75 (1926), 115–126. His conclusions and readings are incorporated in the edition of M. Lenchantin de Gubernatis.

[27] C., 17.1: *loedere* ( = *ludere*) Schuster, Friedrich *laedere* Birt op. cit. *ledere* mss.

[28] C., 17.5 f.: *sali subsili* V ( = GO) *sali subsali* later mss. *Salisubsilis* Sta., Baehrens, Friedrich *'sali subsili'* Birt op. cit. The grammatical objection to Birt's retention of the mss. reading (Hans Rubenbauer, Bursian's Jahresbericht über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, 212 [1927], 199) is answered by Lenchantin, who gives two Petronian examples of this substantive use of the imperative (Petr., Sat., 44.3, 57.11).

[29] Servius, Aen. 2.166: . . . *pontifices a ponte sublicio . . . sicut carmina Saliorum loquuntur*. This is interpreted as confirmation of a Salian bridge dance

implies that these *sacra* were a regular event at Colonia. The possibility is that they were proposed by the poet merely as a vigorous test of the bridge's supports.[30] What is certain, however, and for our purposes sufficient, is the non-Hellenistic character of these rites, and the circumstance that the poet chanced to mention this strange name in connection with a Transpadane town. If they are Roman in origin, rather than purely local, still the absence of the name elsewhere makes it likely that this was at least a local variant of the Roman practice.

Neither the poem set in Colonia nor that of Sirmio, then, contains a certain allusion to a local cult. There is no positive assurance that the Neptune in question is local rather than Hellenistic; and the rites on the bridge, though most likely involving some Salian-like leaping, are uncertain as to their origin and frequency. One feature which the two poems have in common, however, predisposes the reader to discern local cult references in them: the poems themselves belong to that class which may be called "intensely local in character." [31]

When, on the other hand, the poet establishes a no more definite setting for a poem than the culturally eclectic late-Republican society, as is usually the case, or when some other poetic setting is fixed, the divine coloring is appropriately more exotic. The poet's kisses for Lesbia are countless as the sands about the shrine of Jupiter Ammon; [32] his friend's *scortillum* wishes to appropriate a sedan chair for a lift to the temple of Sarapis, who by this time was a fully-naturalized deity of Rome's demi-monde and lower classes; [33] in a line reminiscent of an Alexandrian frag-

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by Frazer, Fasti, IV, 94; Birt, op. cit. This interpretation is opposed by Wissowa, RK², 558, n. 1; Baehrens on C., 17; Geiger, RE, 2nd s., I, 1893 f.

[30] RK², 558, n. 1; Baehrens.

[31] Phrase used by Arthur Leslie Wheeler, Catullus and the Traditions of Ancient Poetry (Berkeley, Calif., 1934), 26, to describe C., 17.

[32] C., 7.5 f.

[33] C., 10.26 f. The mistresses of the Roman elegists are commonly represented as devotees of Isis, a favorite of the Roman women, and for whom they observed ten-day periods of ritual abstinence; cf. Tibullus, 1.3.23–26; Propertius, 2.33.1–22, 4.5.34. András Alföldi, A Festival of Isis in Rome under the Christian Emperors of the IVth Century (Dissertationes Pannonicae, ser. II, fasc. 7 [1937]), 42–46, describes the rôle of the Egyptian cults as the superstition of orientals and the lower classes in the late Republic and early Empire until the ultimate ascendancy of these cults to the forefront of the conservative reaction to Christianity.

ment, Mamurra is compared to Adonis or a white dove of Venus.[34] However, this is not the place for a full catalogue of the divine names cited by Catullus, nor is it necessary to belabor the obvious point that in describing a society whose culture was already to a great degree Hellenized he followed the practice normal among the urban poets in employing the names of Graeco-Roman and foreign gods. Among these poems that are universal rather than local in reference, the long apostrophe to Venus and the hymn to Diana invoke Aphrodite and Artemis under their Latin names.[35] Judging by these criteria, we can expect that the poet's instinct would have forbidden the incongruous mating of local and exotic elements within the same poem. We have a conspicuous example of such an incongruity from a later period, in the pedantic epigram comparing Hadrian's Antinous with Belenus, the Celtic Apollo of Aquileia.[36]

If, then, we are to look for harmony between the god and the rest of the poetic background, the *divi parentes* of the sixty-fourth poem cannot very well be a reference to the poet's life in Verona. For 396 of its 408 lines the poem consists of the description of a Golden Age when Greek heroes associated with gods of Greek mythology. The remaining dozen lines are concerned with the sins of a later age: fratricide, lack of filial devotion toward dead parents, covetousness for a son's fiancée, and that incest which defiles the *divi parentes*. No setting is established in this last part, except the contrast between the world of latter generations and that earlier, happier day when gods consorted with men. And even here the debt to the common fund of Hesiodic descriptions of the decline to an Age of Iron is so apparent that any attempt to spot allusions to prominent contemporary examples in the enumeration of latter-day vices seems idle.[37]

The setting of the poem as a whole is non-Italic; the setting

[34] C., 29.8.

[35] C., 36.11 ff.; C., 34.

[36] CIL, XIV, 3535 = CLE, 879.

[37] Cf. Hesiod, Works and Days, 172–201, Lucretius, 3.70 ff., Sallust, Catiline, 10–13. The similarities with the unwilling sin of Jocasta, the seduction of a daughter-in-law at Verona (C., 67.37 ff.), or the rumor that Catiline did away with his own son in order to please a prospective bride (Sall., Cat. 15) do not correspond exactly with the details of this passage. It is also unlikely that Catullus' personal lampoon of the incest of a certain Gellius (C., 88–90) is taken up here.

of the last portion, in marked contrast to the poems about Sirmio and Colonia, is vague and adheres to a Greek literary tradition. Therefore, depending on the argument of dramatic setting, we have good reason to assert definitely that the *divi parentes* of vs. 404 have nothing peculiarly Veronese about them. In all likelihood these are the dead forbears of the sinning mother, in the normal Roman sense of *di parentes*; they are certainly not local gods.

None of the sixteen other occurrences of the word *parens* listed in Wetmore's index to Catullus lends itself to unusual interpretations. With two exceptions all the references are to living parents. In the tender *ave atque vale* to his brother, where respect to the dead is paid *prisco more parentum*, the word *parentes* is equal to *maiores* in general.[38] Only four lines above the *divos-scelerare-parentes* passage in poem sixty-four, mention is made of the son who ceases to mourn his *exstinctos parentes*.[39] The shift in meaning would be abrupt and difficult, if Catullus had meant anything but the family's dead by *divi parentes*.[40]

One final guide to the poet's intent can be found in his hymeneal admonition to the bride not to be reluctant: only one third of her maidenhood is hers, while another third is apportioned to each of her parents.[41] Even if allowance is made for this tripartite division of virginity as a literary conceit, the attitude it reflects still gives point to the crime of incest as an offence against the *divi parentes*.

[38] C., 101.7; Robinson Ellis ad locum; cf. Aen., 6.223.

[39] C., 64.400.

[40] Cf. C., 67.24: *conscelerare domum*, and the metonymy of the house with the household gods in 9.3: *domum ad tuos penates*, and 31.9: *larem ad nostrum*.

[41] C., 62.63.

# COLERIDGE ON SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY, AND POETRY: THEIR RELATION TO RELIGION

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IN 1791, when he was eighteen years of age, Coleridge came across Burke's A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. Although he was sufficiently interested to read the essay, he was not impressed by it. In fact, if one is to judge his reaction by the *jeu d'esprit*, "Mathematical Problem," it was chiefly one of amusement.[1] Although he went on to read Burke's other essays, he was attracted by the character of the author and the style of his writing rather than by his point of view; for, certainly a young man who was an avowed disciple of David Hartley, a champion of the French Revolution, and the originator of Pantisocracy could find little comfort in the works of Edmund Burke. But the zeal for Hartley, the French Revolution, and Pantisocracy was short-lived; and by 1796 Coleridge had turned, a "thought-bewilder'd man," to a reading of Bishop Berkeley. The influence of Berkeley, especially of the later Platonic Berkeley,[2] began to show in his work almost at once; the influence of Burke continued to lag. Out of his reflections on Berkeley, however, came a new admiration for Burke, particularly for his Philosophical Inquiry; and, from the combined teachings of the two, Coleridge ultimately derived suggestions for a theology broad enough to account for and to give meaning and purpose to all human activities. I should like here to indicate briefly the use he made of these suggestions with respect to science, philosophy, and poetry. I do not mean to imply that there were no other influences at work in the formulation of his views; but I do submit that these two influences are basic and that Coleridge's position can be adequately understood only in terms of them.

[1] See Werkmeister, "Coleridge's 'Mathematical Problem,'" Modern Language Notes, forthcoming.

[2] As Coleridge put it, Berkeley "in his riper and better years." See Unpublished Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (London, 1932), II, 265. But there is considerable doubt that Berkeley shifted his position in these later years.

## Science and Religion

Since it was Burke's thesis that "the ruling principle of the sublime" is terror,[3] much of the Philosophical Inquiry is an inquiry into the cause of terror; and, since it was his further thesis that there is "little purpose" in looking for the cause of any passion "in association, until we fail of it in the natural properties of things" (IV, ii), the inquiry is ultimately concerned with the "natural properties" of man. To begin with, then, said Burke, terror is usually a response to the unknown, so that "[to] make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary" (II, iii). It seems, in fact, to be "our ignorance of things that causes all our admiration, and chiefly excites our passions. Knowledge and acquaintance make the most striking causes effect but little. It is thus with the vulgar; and all men are as the vulgar in what they do not understand. The ideas of eternity and infinity are among the most affecting we have; and yet perhaps there is nothing of which we really understand so little, as of infinity and eternity" (II, iv). The implication is that all obscure objects possess power by very virtue of their obscurity, and it is this power which is ultimately "terrible." However, some objects seem to possess, in addition to the power derived from obscurity, a power of action which might affect us. In this case the terror is enormously enhanced, for, as Burke said, "it is our nature, when we do not know what may happen to us, to fear the worst that can happen" (II, xix). Hence "ghosts and goblins" are terrible, not only because "none can form clear ideas of them," but because they seem to have the power to injure us; and for the same reason governments are terrible when "the chief [is kept] from the public eye" (II, iii). But the most terrible object of all is God. According to Burke, "no conviction of the justice with which [divine power] is exercised, nor the mercy with which it is tempered, can wholly remove the terror that naturally arises from a force which nothing can withstand." All religious feeling, therefore, has its origin in fear, and to this extent Burke found "the common maxim, *Primus in orbe deos fecit timor*," strictly accurate. The sole difference

[3] Philosophical Inquiry, II, ii. Further references to this work will appear parenthetically in the text.

between a false religion and a true one is that false religions attempt to aggravate the fear, whereas true religions, "[by humanizing] the idea of the Divinity" and so justifying the ways of God to man, attempt to mitigate it. But, despite all the efforts of religion, no one ever succeeds in attaining "an entire love and devotion to the Deity," for "the most natural and the most striking effect" is and remains terror (II, v). So far as Burke was concerned, all of this argues for the "wisdom of our Creator," who, when he "intended that we should be affected with anything, . . . did not confide the execution of his design to the languid and precarious operation of our reason; but . . . endued it with powers and properties that prevent the understanding, and even the will; which, seizing upon the senses and imagination, captivate the soul before the understanding is ready either to join with them or oppose them" (II, vii).

Burke was, of course, interested in the "natural properties" of man only insofar as they relate to aesthetics; hence, even if he had been acquainted with the later writings of Berkeley, he would have had little occasion to refer to them. The fact remains that Berkeley supplemented Burke's remarks about these "natural properties" in two important respects. To begin with, Berkeley separated ideas which are necessarily obscure from those which are not. In accordance with "the ancient philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras," he distinguished three "sorts of objects": first, "a form or species that is neither generated nor destroyed, unchangeable, invisible, and altogether imperceptible to sense"; second, phenomena, "ever fluent and changing, generating and perishing, appearing and vanishing"; and, third, "matter." But since, if "matter" exists, the human mind has no faculty for the perception of it and since in any event it cannot possibly exist as we conceive it,[4] Berkeley dismissed the third "sort of object" as a figment. The second "sort" is, he conceded, real, but real only as perceptions. There are no "things" which correspond with these perceptions, but the perceptions are too regular to be regarded as entirely our own invention. Although they are constantly changing, the changes occur in strict accordance with "corporeal rules" which are discoverable by the understanding. The first

[4] Siris, Sec. 306; Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. LXVII.

"sort of objects," which alone may "be said truly to exist," are not given in experience nor abstracted from experience, but are discovered in the mind itself, when "the soul . . . returning into herself . . . unravels and beholds her own essence." The question is, how do these objects get into the mind? Berkeley suggested that they are "native inbred notions," or, as he more cautiously expressed it, "Some perhaps may think the truth to be this: that there are properly no ideas or passive objects in the mind, but what were derived from sense: but that there are also besides these her own acts or operations: such are [these objects]." [5] The important thing is that, whereas perceptual ideas are capable of being understood, the ideas created by the mind are not. They cannot be "defined and measured by the accuracy of human [understanding]," and therefore they cannot be explained: they can only be "received with humility of faith." [6] They cannot even be known, for, as Berkeley put it, the "most refined intellect exerted to its utmost reach, can only seize some imperfect glimpses of the Divine ideas, abstracted from all things corporeal, sensible and imaginable." [7]

In addition to distinguishing ideas which are necessarily obscure from those which are capable of being understood, Berkeley also explained why "divine ideas," which should have a powerful hold on human emotions, have in fact a very feeble one. To begin with, he said, ideas do not *excite* feelings: they merely attract feelings which are already in existence and, in effect, seeking an object. Unfortunately, despite its "flowing, unstable, and uncertain nature," the world is so "[amusing to] the eyes and ears and [so] suited to vulgar uses and the mechanic arts of life" [8] that it is bound to take precedence over the world of "divine ideas." Hence it is natural for feelings to attach themselves to objects of that world, and, when the result is "satiety and disrelish," as it invariably is, it is even natural that the feelings should simply substitute one such object for another. If men were capable of learning from experience, human life would not be that "restless

[5] Siris, Secs. 308, 309, 333, 336.
[6] A Sermon for the Propagation of the Gospel.
[7] Siris, Sec. 337
[8] Principles of Human Knowledge, Secs. XCII–XCVI.

motion of the mind" from "terrene object" to "terrene object,"[9] which it, in fact, is, and the task of religion would be a simple one. But, since men learn nothing from experience, it requires all the efforts of a large clergy to attract the feelings to "divine objects," where alone they can find peace, or, as Berkeley phrased it on one occasion, "[to form and accustom minds] to receive pleasure and pain from proper objects." [10]

Coleridge accepted completely Berkeley's classification of "objects." It seemed to him self-evident that the mind contains two distinct kinds of ideas: those which depend in some degree upon sense data and those "which the Reason by the necessity of its own excellence, creates for itself" [11] independent of all such data. He agreed further that the first kind is capable of being understood and that the second kind is not. The understanding, he insisted, takes its materials from the senses, it judges strictly "according to sense," and its judgments "are binding only in relation to the objects of our Senses." [12] It can furnish no knowledge whatever about "spiritual verities, or truths of reason," which are "differenced from the conceptions of the understanding by the immediatcy [sic] of the knowledge, and [are differenced] from the immediate truths of sense — by not being sensible, that is not representable by figure, measurement, or weight; nor connected with any affection of our sensibility, such as color, taste, odors, and the like." [13] The judgments of the understanding do not contradict "spiritual verities" because, in Coleridge's words, they are simply "*not in the* [*same*] *direction*. . . . They do not move on the same line or plane with them, and therefore cannot contradict them." [14] Coleridge finally agreed with Berkeley that "[we] all have obscure feelings that must be connected with something or other" [15] and that it is the task of religion to connect them with spiritual objects.

[9] A Sermon for the Propagation of the Gospel.

[10] Alciphron, Dia. VII, Sec. xxxiv.

[11] Friend; a Literary, Moral, and Political Weekly Paper (Grasmere, 1809–1810), p. 81.

[12] Aids to Reflection (London, 1825), pp. 209–210; Notes on English Divines by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. The Rev. Derwent Coleridge (London, 1853), II, 338.

[13] English Divines, I, 363.

[14] Aids, p. 197.

[15] Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (Oxford, 1956), II, 768.

But, whereas Berkeley seemed to suppose that no more is required of men than a faith in "divine ideas," Coleridge insisted upon the necessity for a more fundamental faith: a faith in the reason itself as the creator of those ideas. "Reason," he maintained, is *"the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world"*; [16] and, if any man "lose [his] faith in *Reason*, as the perpetual Revelation, [he loses his] faith altogether" and has nothing left "but a beastly fear and superstition." [17] This statement has two crucially important implications. In the first place, Coleridge denies categorically the possibility of external revelation. He made this implication explicit when he promised that religion would "for ever remain exposed [to silly objections] as long as the word Revelation is applied to any thing that can be *bona fide* given to the mind *ab extra*, through the sense of eye, ear or touch. No! all revelation is and must be *ab intra*." [18] It follows that religions can make assertions, but they can furnish no proof, since the only proof lies within every man individually. The sole difference between Christianity and other religions in this respect is that, in the case of Christianity, every thoughtful man is bound to find the proof, for, as Coleridge put it, Christianity is "objective *Reason*": it is "within a man, even as he is a being gifted with reason." [19] In the second place, Coleridge redefines the term *faith*. Faith is no longer a simple affirmation of the understanding or the feelings, but "a *total* act of the soul: it is the *whole* state of the mind, or it is not at all!" Although such holistic faith cannot be given to any man, still no man can achieve it unaided. For this reason God has "ordained us to live in Society" and has given us the "blessed" gift of language so that we may help each other by "every fair appeal to [the understanding], the Feelings, the Imagination, and even the Fancy." [20] This means that religion is only one of several aids to faith; and, to be effective at all, it must work in close alliance with the sciences, philosophy, and the arts. The first question is, how precisely is religion related to science?

[16] English Divines, I, 90.
[17] Unpublished Letters, II, 442.
[18] English Divines, II, 322; I, 217–18.
[19] Specimens of the Table Talk of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge (London, 1851), Jan. 6, 1823; Unpublished Letters, II, 338.
[20] Friend, pp. 26, 41, 372, 375.

"I have [long] considered the disproportion of human passions to their ordinary Objects among the strongest internal evidences of our future destination, and the attempt to restore them to their rightful Claimants, the most imperious Duty and the noblest Task of Genius," [21] Coleridge said in 1809. However, "Genius" works in various ways. In religion it can do little more than suggest these "rightful Claimants." Although the ideas it suggests are already in the mind, they have sunk below the level of conscious thought, and the suggestion itself will not recall them. It will, however, arouse the conscience, which, remembering what the mind itself has forgotten, will respond with a "sense of certainty," saying, in effect, "It *must* be so." [22] With this affirmation, which for Coleridge constitutes absolute proof, the ideas should, according to Burke, at once excite terror; but here Coleridge took issue with the Philosophical Inquiry on two accounts. In the first place, he suggested that the feeling allied with obscure ideas is more properly one of admiration and wonder; in the second place, he agreed with Berkeley that ideas do not excite feelings: they attract them, the feelings being already in existence. But what Berkeley failed to see, in Coleridge's opinion, is that "divine ideas," however mysterious, can attract only feelings which are free; if the feelings are already engaged elsewhere, all the efforts of religion will fail to dislodge them. Religion can, of course, point to the facts of experience, but, as Berkeley himself admitted, nothing is thereby gained. The alcoholic already knows the price he is paying for his vice, Coleridge argued, and still he raises "his daily or hourly draught to his lips." In fact, one needs only to glance at history to see how little mankind profits from experience. Nations move pendulum-wise from one political extreme to another, always mistaking "the feelings of disappointment, disgust, and abhorrence occasioned by the unhappy effects of a particular System for an insight into the falsehood of its principles." But "feelings" are quickly forgotten — in fact, Coleridge added, "the more vivid they are in the moment of their existence the more dim and difficult to be remembered do they make the thoughts which accompanied

[21] Friend, p. 26.
[22] Table Talk, Jan. 6, 1823.

them," so that in a few years the same system is tried all over again.[23]

Before religion can succeed in its endeavors, therefore, the "Impediments" must be removed; and, since these impediments are things, conceptions, and theories originating in the phenomenal world, which retain their hold on the feelings only because they, too, seem to be mysteries, the task of removing them clearly belongs to science. Physics has already put an end to animism, just as psychology has put an end to "the belief in ghosts, witches, sensible replies to prayer, and the like"; [24] and science must continue its work until everything is explained which is capable of explanation. Only then will it completely liberate the feelings, so that religion can direct them to those "ideal truths, which are always mysteries to the understanding." [25] The encouragement of science, therefore, Coleridge regarded as "a positive command of the moral law." [26] As he put it at length, it is incumbent upon all men, but especially upon us as Christians, to habituate

> the intellect to clear, distinct, and adequate conceptions concerning all things that are the possible objects of clear conception, and thus to remove our obscure notions and the vivid feelings which, when the objects of these obscure notions are habitually present to the mind, become associated with them by a natural infinity . . . — to reserve these feelings for those objects, which their very sublimity renders indefinite, no less than their indefiniteness renders them sublime: Being, Form, Life, the Reason, the Law of Conscience, Freedom, Immortality, God! To connect with the objects of our sense the obscure notions and consequent vivid feelings which are due only to our Ideas of Immaterial and permanent Things, is profanation relative to the heart, and superstition in the understanding.[27]

## Philosophy and Religion

So far as Burke was concerned, philosophy is little more than a dangerous plaything. Its fundamental fallacy, in his opinion, is

[23] Friend, pp. 74, 109.
[24] English Divines, II, 51.
[25] Table Talk, May 15, 1833.
[26] Biographia Literaria by S. T. Coleridge, ed. John Shawcross (London, 1907), II, 117.
[27] Friend, pp. 74–75.

that, being a purely intellectual discipline, it tends to ignore everything which is not purely intellectual. Instead of beginning, therefore, with "a deep knowledge of human nature and human necessities," [28] it invariably begins with some abstract notion of man based on his reasoning faculty. Since it seemed evident to Burke that men are not wholly or even primarily reasoners, to regard them as such is as perilous as it is unrealistic. "This is the true touchstone of all theories which regard men and the affairs of men," he said, "— does it [sic] suit his nature in general? does it suit his nature as modified by his habits?" [29] There are, it appears, only two means of determining what man's "nature" is. The first is to consult history. But this means, it turns out, is hazardous; for, as Burke explained, "the human mind and human affairs are susceptible of [such] infinite modifications, and of combinations [so] wholly new and unlooked for" [30] that it is almost impossible "to distinguish things of accident from permanent causes" or at times to distinguish any cause whatever except the "irresistible hand of the Great Disposer." [31] A far safer means is to consult the "general prejudices." Since philosophy insists upon interpreting everything in terms of "reason," these "prejudices" have at least the advantage of representing, not one man's "private stock of reason," which Burke suspected was "small," but "the general bank and capital of nations and of ages." They have the much greater advantage of reflecting man's "inward feelings," which, in Burke's opinion, are vastly "more important" than his thoughts. For Burke, "prejudices" are, in fact, the chief source of "wisdom," and it seemed incredible to him, therefore, that "men of speculation" should be permitted to "explode" them. The best possible employment for their "sagacity," he suggested, would be "to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them," although so much did he distrust the "reason" that he could not believe that even this discovery had any practical value. For, when philosophers have made their discovery, he said, it will still

[28] Reflections on the Revolution in France.

[29] "Speech on a Motion . . . to Inquire into the State of the Representation of the Commons in Parliament."

[30] Remarks on the Policy of the Allies with Respect to France.

[31] Three Letters Addressed to a Member of the Present Parliament, on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France.

be found "more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice, and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it permanence. . . . Through just prejudices [man's] duty becomes a part of his nature." [32] "Theories" also, of course, excite the emotions and provide a motive for action, and it is for precisely this reason that Burke was afraid of them. "There is no doctrine whatever," he warned, "that is not capable of [mischief]. The social nature of man impels him to propagate his principles, as much as physical impulses urge him to propagate his kind. The passions give zeal and vehemence. The understanding bestows design and system. The whole man moves under the discipline of his opinions," [33] The difference seems to be that, in the case of "prejudices," the "feelings" direct the "reason"; in the case of "theories," the "reason" directs the "feelings"; and it is this domination of the "reason" which makes "theories" dangerous.

Berkeley also had reservations with respect to philosophy, but reservations of a different kind. He was afraid, not of intellectual activity, but of intellectual laziness, which he regarded as an almost universal human trait. It seemed to him ironically true that, although all men are ruled by "notions and opinions," the average man is too indolent to formulate any notions for himself or in any sense to evaluate those he borrows from others. He therefore seizes any ready-made notion which comes along, provided only that it purports to be something new and that it requires no intellectual exertion on his part. Since, in his opinion, the first step in civilizing the animal man is to bring him under government, Berkeley tended to regard the situation from the point of view of the state. And since, as he said, some "order and regularity" in public opinion is "necessary, not only to the well-being, but to the very being of a state," his problem was to find some means of regularizing the notions of the masses through education. As he

[32] Reflections.

[33] Three Letters. It will be evident that by *reason* Burke means simply "understanding," whereas Coleridge means the power of creating "ideas" or eternal truths. Although Burke was also an intuitionist, he tends to equate intuition with "inward feelings."

saw it, there are only two possibilities. The first is to try to make everyone a philosopher; but this possibility he rejected at once on the ground that the popular aversion to thought is too obstinate and too deeply rooted ever to be overcome. The other possibility is to inculcate in every child those "prejudices" in "political, moral, and religious matters" which happen to be "laudable and useful to society." Berkeley stressed the fact that the "prejudices" will not be falsehoods: they will be philosophical conclusions without the philosophical demonstrations. Even so, he was unwilling to trust the inculcation to anyone except the clergy, for he refused to believe that any inculcation is effective unless it is not only rooted in religion, but presented in the form of religion. When a man is unwilling to think, Berkeley declared, his obedience can be compelled only by fear, and there is no greater fear than the fear of God. In fact, he added, so true is it that the "strongest curb from vice, and the most effectual spur to worthy conduct" are and always will be the belief "that God scans all [human] actions, and will reward or punish them" that statesmen ought to regard any attempt to separate morality from religion as "pernicious to civil society." [34]

But, although philosophy should not concern itself with ethics, it has, in Berkeley's opinion, a serious and crucial function as metaphysics. As Berkeley saw it, every unthinking man is a materialist in that he unconsciously assumes the absolute existence of "matter" and the absolute reality of laws relating to it. The fact remains that materialism is inseparable from atheism and immorality; for, if "matter is real," Berkeley argued, surely any idea of God or of "freedom, intelligence, and design" must be dismissed as a figment.[35] To make religion possible at all, therefore, materialism must be totally discredited, and it can be discredited only by philosophy, which, beginning with a reflection "on ourselves, and the operations of our own minds," interprets nature in terms of such "operations," that is, in terms of moral laws or "final causes." [36] In short, Berkeley concluded, without

[34] A Discourse Addressed to Magistrates and Men in Authority.
[35] Principles of Human Knowledge, Secs. XCII–XCVI.
[36] Alciphron, Dia. VII, Secs. xxii–xxiii.

philosophy, there can be no religion; without religion, there can be no morality.

In effect, Coleridge's position is a synthesis of the positions of Burke and Berkeley. Although Coleridge adopted neither point of view without modification, the care which he took to preserve the essentials of both is ample evidence of the thoughtful consideration he gave them. To begin with, he accepted completely Berkeley's contention that religion cannot exist without philosophy, but he added to it, in a kind of deference to Burke, the contention that philosophy cannot exist without religion. "[You] will find," he warned, "that wherever philosophy has attempted to place itself above religion or to take religion as one of its parts, the consequence has been a dreary scepticism, which has ended in a sensual delivery of our own being up to the wants and appetites of the present state; on the other hand, when a religion, misunderstanding the holy word *faith*, shall attempt to put the extinguisher upon the powers of the intellect, however pure the dogmas may have been in the beginning, so assuredly it will become a mere [blind credulity]." [37] For its own sake, therefore, religion must guard the integrity of philosophy, as, for its own sake, philosophy must guard the integrity of religion.

Religion must guard the integrity of philosophy because, whereas science removes the mundane "Impediments" to faith, it remains for philosophy to prove to the understanding that faith is warranted and necessary. More specifically, it is the nature of "feelings" to attach themselves to mysterious objects; when the objects are explained in terms satisfactory to the understanding, the "feelings" are *ipso facto* liberated. The task of explaining all objects which are capable of explanation belongs to science. But to the unscientific science is itself a mystery; hence the effect of science is to attach the "feelings" thus liberated to itself, so that, instead of religion, science gives us only scientism: instead of a faith in the "reason" as the source of those "ideal truths, which are always mysteries to the understanding," science gives us only a faith in the understanding. The task of removing this final "Impediment" belongs to philosophy. By "explaining" the under-

[37] The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn (N.Y., 1949), pp. 264, 268; English Divines, II, 63.

standing to itself, by teaching it its own limitations and so establishing "the supremacy of the reason," [38] philosophy prepares the way for religion. Hence philosophy is in a real sense the "supplement of the sciences": [39] "the middle ground between science, or knowledge, and sophia, or wisdom." [40] Although Coleridge's presentation is somewhat different from Berkeley's, the point of view is by no means incongruent; and it is therefore no surprise that Coleridge, like Berkeley, insisted that the terms *philosophy* and *metaphysics* are properly synonymous. Science, he urged, deals with "sensible concretes": philosophy deals with matters "*meta-*, i.e. *beyond* or *transcending* [sensible concretes]." [41]

Philosophy must guard the integrity of religion because it relies upon religion for vitality and direction. This does not mean that philosophy is the tool of religion, for Coleridge stressed the fact that philosophy and religion work together as coequals for a common end, namely, a restoration of faith in the "reason" as the source of all truth. They work, of course, in different ways. Religion appeals only to the "feelings." In effect, it suggests those ideas or spiritual verities which are within every man and calls upon the "feelings" to accept them, not upon its authority, but upon the authority of every individual's "sense of certainty." Religion ought not to be an "*intellectual* passion," Coleridge insisted; even Christianity ought to be "a habit of feeling" rather than "a conviction of the understanding." [42] The fact remains that "a habit of feeling" is impossible without "a conviction of the understanding," and it is the task of philosophy to furnish this "conviction." Hence philosophy is a purely intellectual discipline, appealing only to the understanding. However, its basic principles are identical with those of religion, for philosophy also "[requires] as its premises; nay . . . it supposes . . . as its ground" [43] an unshakeable faith in what Burke called "inner feelings," Berkeley called "the operations of our own minds," and Coleridge called "the sense of certainty." And it depends upon religion to animate this faith.

[38] The Literary Remains of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Henry Nelson Coleridge (London, 1836–39), IV, 433.
[39] The Friend: a Series of Essays, in Three Volumes (London, 1818), III, 162.
[40] Table Talk, July 2, 1830.
[41] Friend (1818), III, 120.
[42] Collected Letters, I, 407, 408, 409.
[43] Biographia Epistolaris, ed. Arthur Turnbull (London, 1911), II, 175.

Hence in an ultimate sense philosophy also appeals to "feelings," and it is in this sense that Coleridge could say, "Believe me, . . . a metaphysical Solution, that does not instantly *tell* you something in the Heart, is grievously to be suspected as apocryphal"[44] and could assert that his own "metaphysics" was intended to "support, to kindle, to project the Spirit; to make the Reason spread Light over our Feelings, to make our Feelings, with their vital warmth actualize our Reason."[45]

The "premises" of philosophy are therefore the same as those of religion, but the "arguments" of philosophy are totally different. Coleridge listed "three distinct sources" of these "arguments": "1. transcendental, or anterior to experience, as the ground without which experience itself could not have been. 2. Subjective, or the experience acquirable by self-observation and composed of facts of inward consciousness, which may be appealed to as assumed to have place in the minds of others but cannot be demonstrated. . . . 3. Common and simultaneous Experience, collectively forming *History* in its widest sense. . . ."[46] Of these "sources," the first was clearly suggested to Coleridge by Berkeley and Kant, the second by Berkeley, the third by Burke. The term *History in its widest sense* includes not only history *per se*, but also what Burke called "prejudices." With respect to history in its restricted sense, Coleridge's remarks reflect all the caution of Burke. History, he urged, cannot itself provide anything more than "facts"; for the discovery of "principles." "all the materials in the world are useless, for you cannot find them; and if you could, you could not arrange them."[47] "Facts" may perhaps suggest "principles" and so lead a "wise man" "to the discovery of the indwelling *law*";[48] but they themselves do not represent truth, nor do they in any sense constitute proof. The truth is still "the indwelling *law*," and the proof is afforded by our "sense of certainty" with respect to it. Hence history's real service is only to provide argumentative material for the philosopher, or,

[44] Collected Letters, II, 961.
[45] Friend, pp. 75–76.
[46] Inquiring Spirit: a New Presentation of Coleridge, ed. Kathleeen Coburn (London, 1951), p. 124.
[47] Table Talk, Sept. 21, 1830.
[48] Biographia, II, 39.

in Coleridge's words, it is the "appropriate praise" of the "historic muse . . . that her records enable the magnanimous to silence the selfish . . . by appealing to actual *events* for the confirmation of those truths, which they themselves first learnt from the super oracle of their own reason." [49]

In its "widest sense" history includes what Coleridge called "universal persuasions," that is, religious and philosophical notions which occur and recur in areas widely separated in time and space, springing, as it were, spontaneously from the people. Whenever the "persuasion" or "prejudice" seems to be "as old as the first dawn of human Reason," the presumption certainly is, Coleridge admitted, that it is based upon some truth of the "reason." [50] In fact, he confessed, "I am [myself] firmly persuaded, that no doctrine was ever widely diffused, among various nations through successive ages, and under different religions . . . which is not founded either in the nature of things, or in the necessities of human nature. Nay, the more strange and irreconcileable such a doctrine may appear to the understanding, . . . the stronger is the presumption in its favor. For whatever satirists may say, or sciolists imagine, the human mind has no predilection for absurdity." [51] Coleridge was obviously agreeing with Burke that, from a study of "prejudices," philosophers might derive that "deep knowledge of human nature and human necessities" which constitutes "wisdom." But here the agreement ended. In a scathing attack on Burke, Coleridge made it clear that he was totally out of sympathy with a glorification of "feelings" as something God-given and therefore to be obeyed at any cost and with a consequent veneration of "the most absurd Prejudices" merely because "FEELINGS have given [them] Consecration" for a long period of time.[52] It is the "mind," Coleridge insisted, which has "no predilection for absurdity"; the "feelings" are usually misdirected. Hence it is the "latent wisdom" contained in the "prejudice" which deserves our veneration, not the "prejudice" itself. Doctrines of ghosts, witchcraft, and the marvelous nature of dreams are surely

[49] Essays on His Own Times by Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Sara Coleridge (London, 1850), p. 614.
[50] Friend, pp. 3–4, 76.
[51] Friend (1818), III, 102; Literary Remains, I, 322.
[52] Friend, p. 131.

as old as mankind, and yet there is nothing venerable about them except the deep psychological truth which they reflect, namely, man's awe of the mysterious. For Coleridge, therefore, "persuasions" and "prejudices," like all historical "facts," are valuable only insofar as there are "principles to be evolved from, and illustrated by, the facts." [53] They differ from other historical "facts" only because they are more likely to lead a "wise man" to the discovery of "the indwelling *law*" and because they provide him with more compelling argumentative material.

The first two kinds of argumentative material are the "transcendental, or anterior to experience, as the ground without which experience itself could not have been," and the "subjective, or the experience acquirable by self-observation and composed of facts of inward consciousness." The precise use which the philosopher makes of this material is perhaps suggested by Coleridge's statement that the first concern of philosophy is "the origin and primary laws (or efficient causes) . . . of the WORLD, man included (which is *Natural* Philosophy)," its second "Human Nature exclusively, and as far only as it is *human* (which is *Moral* Philosophy)," its third "the sufficiency of the human reason to the solution of both or either of the two former." [54] Beginning with an examination of nature, philosophy demonstrates the inadequacy of a materialistic interpretation and in so doing makes its first distinction between the "understanding," which must interpret all things materialistically, and the "reason," which, without contradicting the conclusions of the "understanding," brings them into cosmic perspective under the form of eternal law. It then proceeds to an examination of man himself, showing that to regard man as merely an "understanding" animal is to ignore everything which is uniquely human. Finally, it demonstrates that only the "reason" is capable of interpreting the whole of the universe, including man, without limitations and without contradictions. Thus, by a constant and meticulous distinction between the "reason" and the "understanding," philosophy removes "the distinction between philosophy and faith"; [55] and it becomes "the

[53] Table Talk, July 13, 1832.
[54] Philosophical Lectures, pp. 68, 247.
[55] Friend (1818), II, 259.

servant and pioneer of Faith" [56] by convincing the understanding itself that its own judgments are necessarily tentative: that it can "only say, — This *is*, or *ought* to be so" and that the "reason" alone can say, "It *must* be so." [57] In particular, philosophy demonstrates the fact that neither itself nor religion can provide ultimate truth, since it is characteristic of the eternal mysteries that they cannot even be adequately communicated by words: certainly they cannot be "explained" by "*notional* and metaphysical speculations" [58] or "proved" by any experience *ab extra*. Philosophy, like religion, can lead only to the "Temple of Revelation," and every man must enter the temple alone.[59]

In defining "*Moral* Philosophy" as the philosophy of "Human Nature exclusively, and as far only as it is *human*," Coleridge meant to imply that he was excluding ethics, which, like Berkeley, he assigned to religion. But, whereas Berkeley justified his action on the ground that ethics is ineffectual unless it is grounded in the fear of God, Coleridge argued only that "morality" is not so much an intellectual discipline as a matter of good "feeling." It seemed to him, for example, that Stoicism had erred in "[attaching] the highest honour (or rather, [attaching] honour *solely*) to the person that acts virtuously in spite of his feelings, or who has raised himself above the conflict by their extinction." And he rejoiced that Christianity "instructs us to place small reliance on a Virtue that does not *begin* by bringing the Feelings to a conformity with the Commands of the Conscience." Or, as he put it at greater length, "Philosophy [once] sought to purify and to elevate the Moral Character" by "undeceiving, enlarging, and informing the Intellect"; but

> Christianity [wisely] reversed the order. By means accessible to all, by inducements operative on all, and by convictions, the grounds and materials of which all men might find in themselves, her first step was to cleanse the *Heart*. . . . In preventing the rank vapours that steam up from the corrupt *Heart*, Christianity restores the Intellect to its natural clearness. By relieving the mind from the distractions and

[56] Aids, p. 179.
[57] Table Talk, Jan. 6, 1823.
[58] Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge (London, 1895), II, 719.
[59] Friend, p. 19.

> importunities of the unruly passions, she improves the *quality* of the Understanding: while at the same time she presents for its contemplations Objects so great and so bright as cannot but enlarge the Organ, by which they are contemplated.[60]

Coleridge readily agreed with Berkeley, therefore, that " to separate ethics from the faith in the Invisible" is "to stab morality through the side of religion." [61] But it seemed equally clear to him that to separate the faith in the Invisible from ethics is to stab religion through the side of morality. Just as ethics must depend upon a "cleansing" of "the Heart" by religion to make it effective, so religion must depend upon an origin in morality to make it compelling. In fact, Coleridge was inclined to believe that morality implies religion to an even greater extent than religion implies morality. At least, it was his own observation that, although a "belief of [sic] God and a future state . . . does not indeed always beget a good heart, . . . a good heart so naturally begets the belief, that the very few exceptions must be regarded as strange anomalies from strange and unfortunate circumstances," and it therefore seemed reasonable to suppose that, throughout the course of history, it has been less religion which made men good than morality which made them religious. In any event, he concluded, a religion which loses sight of its "*moral* origin" loses its grasp upon the people and becomes simply an abstraction.[62] The longer Coleridge pondered the relationship between religion and morality the more certain he became that they are essentially one. It is doubtful, he said, on one occasion, that "morality can be said to have any principle distinguishable from religion, or religion any substance divisible from morality"; [63] and again he declared that "morality without religion" is "as senseless a scheme as religion without morality," [64] for which reason they cannot "be disjoined without the destruction of both." [65]

With respect to the dissemination of philosophy, Coleridge again found himself in fundamental agreement with Berkeley, but he

[60] Aids, pp. 91, 183.
[61] Friend (1818), III, 122–23.
[62] Biographia, I, 135, 136.
[63] Friend (1818), III, 67–68.
[64] Letters, II, 676.
[65] Friend (1818), III, 127.

was by no means deaf to the warnings of Burke. Admitting at once that philosophical theories are potentially mischievous, he went on to insist that the mischief is realized only when a theory is half-understood or misunderstood, for only then does it have that attraction for the "feelings" which is characteristic of mysteries. Since any theory presented to the people in language which is familiar to them is bound to be half-understood or misunderstood, Coleridge was opposed to any semblance of popularization. Philosophers must regard it as a sacred duty, he declared, to present their views in such a manner that they will be immediately intelligible only to trained philosophers. Only so will the mischief be averted, for such is the general aversion to thought that there is no possibility whatever that the "populace" will then attempt to read philosophical writings or listen to philosophical lectures. But, although to "the immense majority of men, even in civilized countries, speculative philosophy has been, and must remain, a terra incognita," [66] the settled conclusions of philosophy must be communicated to the people insofar as the people are capable of understanding them. Even here, however, the communicator dares not rely overmuch on rational arguments. Remembering always that his audience "feels" rather than "thinks," he must see to it that the "head" is not "disjoined from the heart": [67] in short, his presentation must be made in the guise of religion. Since, to those who are totally incapable of thought, even the simplest conclusions of philosophy will be unintelligible, education at its lowest level can be nothing more than religious and moral precept.

Thus far Coleridge has not deviated, except by way of development, from the position of Berkeley; but, whereas Berkeley was content to stop at this point, Coleridge was not. It seemed to him that there is another kind of popular education, which, although more subtle than the one suggested by Berkeley, is also perhaps more powerful. Philosophical theories, Coleridge maintained, are not merely filed away in books. Once they have become firmly established among philosophers, it is inevitable that they will be slowly incorporated into the common language, finally becoming

[66] The Statesman's Manual (London, 1816), p. 17. I have dealt with this aspect of Coleridge's thinking at some length elsewhere. See "Coleridge and Godwin on the Communication of Truth," Modern Philology, LV (1958), 237–246.

[67] Friend (1818), III, 259.

an intrinsic part of the language pattern. If it uses language at all, therefore, the "populace" is compelled to accept unconsciously as linguistic idiom what it refused to accept consciously as rational doctrine. Coleridge stated his case in the form of a definition:

> [As] often as I have questioned myself what the exact meaning of the words "common sense" is, I can find no other explanation than the following: when that which had been in the schools, and was communicable only by a technical language, in consequence of its compleat [sic] correspondence with the inward and outward experience of all men, becomes part of the general language, so that men by the mere mechanism of language can think as a man can do sums, by a carpenter's rule, then it becomes what we call "common sense," which is an ever varying thing. What is philosophy in one age is common sense in another. . . . The more industrious philosophy is, the larger the sphere of common sense. . . .[68]

Hence, although there is no possibility that "all men" or even that "many, [will] be PHILOSOPHERS,"[69] "nature herself [having] provided against any too great increase in this class of her productions,"[70] philosophy works silently through the medium of linguistic idiom to prepare the ground for faith.

## Philosophy and Poetry

In the "Discourse Concerning Taste," which formed the introduction to his Philosophical Inquiry, Burke attempted to show that the "principles" of "taste" are "the same in all men," but "the degree to which these principles prevail, in the several individuals of mankind, is altogether . . . different" inasmuch as the "qualities" upon which the "principles" depend, namely, "sensibility and judgment, . . . vary exceedingly in various people." In the course of his argument, he stipulated that, of these two "qualities," "sensibility" must be regarded as fundamental; for "sensibility" never implies "judgment," whereas "judgment" always implies "some degree of sensibility." Anyone possessing "sensibility," therefore, also has "taste," but he does not have

[68] Philosophical Lectures, p. 200.
[69] Biographia, I, 164.
[70] Friend (1818), III. 81.

"good taste" unless he has "judgment" as well. Burke illustrated his point by reference to children. "In the morning of our days," he said, "when the senses are unworn and tender, when the whole man is awake in every part, and the gloss of novelty fresh upon all the objects that surround us, how lively . . . are our sensations, but how false and inaccurate the judgments we form of things!" Very evidently, children must be credited with "taste," but in no sense with "good taste."

In the Philosophical Inquiry itself, Burke was concerned with the "passions" involved in an aesthetic experience. Beginning with "curiosity," which he defined as "whatever desire we have for, or whatever pleasure we take in, novelty," he went on to argue that surely this is one of the baser emotions. Again he reverted to the case of children. For example, he said, "curiosity" is the "first and simplest emotion which we discover in the human mind. . . . We see children perpetually running from place to place, to hunt out something new: they catch . . . with very little choice, at whatever comes before them; their attention is engaged by everything, because everything has, in that stage of life, the charm of novelty to recommend it. But as those things, which engage us merely by their novelty, cannot attach us for any length of time, curiosity is the most superficial of the affections. . . ." Certainly as adults, Burke felt, we should be able to derive "pain and pleasure" from "causes" other than "novelty," and, to the extent to which we depend upon "novelty," we sink, in effect, to the level of children. Hence, even though "[some] degree of novelty must be one of the materials in every instrument which works upon the mind," a work of art should, in Burke's opinion, depend upon "other powers besides novelty" and "other passions besides curiosity." [71]

At the other end of the scale, according to Burke, is "astonishment," the most powerful and the most complex of the "passions." "Astonishment" has the unique advantage of so entirely occupying "the mind . . . with its object, that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it. Hence . . . , far from being produced by them, it anticipates

[71] Philosophical Inquiry, I, 1. Further references to this work appear parenthetically in the text.

our reasonings, and hurries us on by an irresistible force." In all instances, it appears, "astonishment" implies "admiration, reverence, and respect" and "some degree of horror" (II, i); but, where the arts are concerned, the element of "horror" or "terror" is so strong that it must be regarded as "the ruling principle of the sublime" (II, ii). The question is, what precisely is the "cause" of "terror"? It seemed to Burke that one "cause" is certainly "infinity"; or, in his words, to be "terrible," an object must "make some sort of approach towards infinity" (II, iv). The "approach" may be made in various ways: by a "uniformity" of parts, for example, combined with a "succession" sufficiently extended to suggest "progress beyond [its] actual limits" (II, ix), by "rotundity," by any "great profusion of things" arranged in apparent disorder (II, xiii), or by anything which contributes to "obscurity," such as indefiniteness of outline, dark colors, cloudy or nocturnal landscapes, "low, confused, uncertain sounds" (II, xix). A second "cause" of "terror," Burke suggested, is "greatness" combined with "some modification of power" which directly or indirectly suggests danger (II, v). Ghosts, storms, large wild animals, military leaders, kings, and, most notably, God are all objects of "terror"; but so in their way are loud noises, glaring colors, "greatness of dimension" (II, vii), and even the evident "*Difficulty*" of a work (II, xii).

On the basis of his analysis, Burke concluded that poetry is the most "*affecting*" of the arts, inasmuch as the "ideas" it is capable of exciting are necessarily obscure, the emotions potentially powerful. As he argued the case:

> If I make a drawing of a palace, or a temple, or a landscape, I present a very clear idea of those objects; but then . . . my picture can at most affect only as the palace, temple, or landscape would have affected in reality. On the other hand, the most lively and spirited verbal description . . . raises a very obscure and imperfect *idea* of such objects; but then it is in my power to raise a stronger *emotion* by the description than I could do by the best painting. . . . The proper manner of conveying the *affections* of the mind from one to another, is by words; there is a great insufficiency in all other methods of communication. . . . (II, iv.)

In a later passage, having restated his thesis that poetry is "much

more capable of making deep and lively impressions than any of the other arts, and even than nature itself in many cases," Burke repeated his previous argument and this time supplied two additional arguments. First, he said, "there are many things of a very affecting nature, which can seldom occur in reality, but the words that represent them often do . . . , as war, death, famine, &c. Besides, many ideas have never been at all presented to the senses of any men but by words, as God, angels, devils, heaven, and hell, all of which have however a great influence over the passions." Moreover, even when painting attempts to present these ideas, it can never give them "those enlivening touches which [they] may receive from words." In short, painting can provide "a clear impression," but not "a strong impression," and it is "a strong impression" which is effective in the arts; for clarity of impression "regards the understanding": strength of impression "belongs to the passions" (V, vii).

Berkeley's problem was to reconcile the world of nature with the world of "divine ideas." It seemed to him, first of all, that, if "matter" is taken to be real, no such reconciliation is possible, and "divine ideas" must be regarded as illusions. But, if the "absurd notion" of "matter" is forgotten and nature is taken to be "only natural appearances" precisely "as we see and perceive them," [72] not only is the reality of "divine ideas" preserved, but nature itself is given dignity and purpose. Beginning, therefore, with the assumption that in the subject-object relationship only the "perceiving active being" has real existence and that the "*esse*" of "unthinking things" consists altogether in their being perceived, Berkeley set out to re-interpret nature. To begin with, he established the fact that "human agents" do not cause their own perceptions. The "constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation, together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole," were for him sufficient proof that "those things which are called the works of nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on the wills of men." They must therefore be de-

[72] Siris, Sec. 292.

pendent on the will of God, "*who works all in all*, and *by whom all things consist*." [73]

Berkeley now turned to the question of why God should produce a nature which has no reality for us except as perceptions. To him the answer was self-evident. Nature is God's means of communicating his thoughts to men; it is in fact a language whereby God teaches men what they should know for their own good here and hereafter. So far as Berkeley was concerned, this conclusion was strengthened by the marvelous manner in which nature is suited to its purpose. It is, said Berkeley, so "wonderfully adapted to suggest and exhibit to us . . . tangible objects; not by similitude, nor yet by reference of necessary connexion, but by the arbitrary imposition of Providence, just as words suggest the things signified by them." "[It] is learned with so little pains, it . . . instructs with such facility and dispatch . . . : and, while it informs, it amuses and entertains the mind with such singular pleasure and delight . . . and it answers so apposite to the uses and necessities of mankind. . . ." [74] Berkeley now faced the final question of how precisely this language is to be interpreted. Here he began with two cautions. First, he warned, we must guard against the vulgar error of mistaking "corporeal causes" for "signification." [75] Like all languages, nature has a syntax, which in this case comprises the so-called "laws of nature." These laws are necessary, for there must be "method and order" in nature and therefore "rules," [76] or "we should be eternally at a loss." [77] But they are only rules: a kind of "grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series of effects in the visible world, whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pass in the natural course of things." [78] They are in no sense categories of interpretation. Moreover, Berkeley warned, we should avoid any attempt to understand the purport of nature in terms of isolated symbols. No one, he said, "can judge of this or that part of a machine taken by itself, without knowing the whole, the mutual relation or dependence of its parts,

[73] Principles of Human Knowledge, Secs. II–III, XXIX, CXLVI.
[74] Alciphron, Dia. IV, Secs. x, xiv–xv.
[75] Siris, Sec. 253; Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec. LXVI.
[76] Siris, Secs. 160, 234.
[77] Principles of Human Knowledge, Secs. XXX–XXXI; Siris, Sec. 255.
[78] Siris, Sec. 252.

and the end for which it was made," and surely we ought "by a parity of reason to suspend our judgment of a single unaccountable part of the Divine economy, till we are . . . fully acquainted with the moral system, . . . the designs of God's providence, and . . . his dispensations past, present, and future." [79] Unhappily, however, we shall derive no such acquaintance from nature; hence we have no choice but to return to "the province of the *philosophia prima*," that is, to "mind and its acts, permanent being." [80] Here in the creations of the mind we shall find those "spiritual truths" which are necessarily "wholes" and which in fact are the true "*laws of nature*" in that "they are universal, and . . . derive their obligation . . . immediately from the Author of nature himself." Using these "truths" as categories, we are now able to read the language of nature; for, through nature, God teaches us the same "universal, determinate rules or moral precepts" as he teaches us immediately through the conscience.[81]

Although in one sense we learn nothing from nature that we might not have learned from the intuitive reason, in another sense nature is an effective supplement of that reason. For example, said Berkeley, without elucidating any of the "mysteries," nature teaches us to accept them. Once we have learned to accept such a mystery as that of personal identity, that is, the persistence of self through a perpetually changing consciousness, it is easy enough to accept the mystery of the Trinity or the mystery of the God-man. Moreover, nature provides constant evidence of the wisdom and goodness of God, who thus sweetly and beautifully teaches us those moral and religious truths which are essential to his creatures. Also, even while it offers "the materialistic chains" which may enslave us, nature perpetually reminds us that we can "break the . . . chains" and find freedom in an ideal world. Finally, nature provides a different kind of persuasion from that of the intuitive reason. Under all these circumstances, it seemed to Berkeley, philosophers could do no better than to concentrate their energies on a rightful interpretation of nature: "to take a comprehensive view of the whole, consider it in all its parts and

[79] Alciphron, Dia. IV, Sec. ii; Dia. VI, Sec. xvi.
[80] Siris, Secs. 293–95.
[81] Passive Resistance, Secs. X, XII.

relations, . . . examine its principles, effects, and tendencies, its proofs internal and external." [82] By "[employing] their thoughts . . . about the final causes of things" and showing "God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world," they would thereby "re-create and exalt the mind, with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety, of natural things" and, "by proper inferences, . . . enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator." [83]

Coleridge accepted immediately and almost without reservation Berkeley's philosophy of nature. Arguing in much the same manner as Berkeley, he began with the purposiveness which, he felt, is evident throughout nature. Even the scientist, he declared, insofar as he is "enlightened," must admit "a teleological ground, . . . that is, the presumption of a something *analogous* to the causality of the human will, by which, without assigning to nature, as nature, a conscious purpose, he may yet distinguish her agency from a blind and lifeless mechanism." [84] That this will is "analogous" to the human will is sufficiently attested, in Coleridge's opinion, by the "remarkable fact . . . that the material world is found to obey the same laws as had been deduced independently from the reason." [85] That it is not the human will is attested by our "sense of certainty." Under these circumstances, it seemed to Coleridge reasonable to suppose that, just as the motions of the body are in their "homely way" "Symbols" of "all the movements of the Soul," [86] so nature is a perfect and sublime symbolic expression of the thoughts of God; or, in his words, "the phenomenon or outward appearance, all that we call thing or matter, is but as it were a language by which the invisible (that which is not the object of our senses) communicates its existence to our finite beings." [87]

The interpretation of this language of nature, Coleridge agreed with Berkeley, is not a task for science; as he put it, "The moment we assume an Origin in Nature, a true *Beginning*, an actual First

[82] Alciphron, Dia. VI, Sec. xxii; Dia. VII, Secs. x–xi, xxii–xxiii.
[83] Principles of Human Knowledge, Secs. LXVI, CV–CIX, CLIII; Siris, Sec. 260.
[84] Friend (1818), III, 221–22.
[85] Philosophical Lectures, p. 333; Friend (1818), III, 159.
[86] Unpublished Letters, II, 47.
[87] Philosophical Lectures, p. 187; Friend (1818), III, 120.

— that moment we rise *above* Nature, and are compelled to assume a *supernatural* Power," of which the scientific understanding knows nothing.[88] But neither, in his opinion, is it a task for philosophers: from the very outset Coleridge seems to have assigned it to poets, and it is noteworthy that his earliest references to the language of nature appear in poetry. For example, in 1796 he was asserting that

> all that meets the bodily sense I deem
> Symbolical, one mighty alphabet
> For infant minds . . . ;[89]

and in 1798 he was describing nature as

> The lovely shapes and sounds intelligible
> Of that eternal language, which thy God
> Utters, who from eternity doth teach
> Himself in all, and all things in himself.[90]

In 1800, having declared flatly that "*The Poet* is the greatest possible character," [91] he explained in verse:

> The poet in his lone yet genial hour
> Gives to his eyes a magnifying power:
> Or rather he emancipates his eyes
> From the black shapeless accidents of size —
> In unctuous cones of kindling coal,
> Or smoke upwreathing from the pipe's trim bole,
> His gifted ken can see
> Phantoms of sublimity.[92]

Berkeley, of course, assigned the interpretation of this language of nature to philosophers, but there are at least two reasons for Coleridge's disagreement with Berkeley on this point, and in both instances his thinking shows the influence of Burke. First, Coleridge could see that, however appealing Berkeley's arguments are to the "imagination" and the "feelings," they are not compelling to the understanding. Not only is there no proof that nature is saying one thing rather than another: there is no proof that nature is saying anything whatever. We have no real external evidence,

[88] Aids, p. 244, note.
[89] "The Destiny of Nations," lines 18–20.
[90] "Frost at Midnight," lines 59–62.
[91] Collected Letters, I, 557.
[92] "Apologia Pro Vita Sua."

and even our "sense of certainty" is lacking. Hence, whereas Berkeley referred to the language of nature and the import of that language as at least logically established facts, Coleridge tended to refer to them as "reasonable assumptions" which are ultimately matters of "feeling." For example, he observed on one occasion: "In looking at objects of Nature while I am thinking, . . . I seem rather to be seeking, as it were *asking* for, a symbolical language for something within me that already and forever exists, than observing anything new. Even when [I am observing something new], yet still I have always an obscure feeling as if that new phenomenon were the dim awaking of a forgotten or hidden truth of my inner nature. It is still interesting [only] as a word — a symbol. It is Λόγος, the Creator and the Evolver! "[93] Again he said specifically: "The one great and binding ground of the belief of God and a hereafter, is the law of conscience: but as the aptitudes, and beauty, and grandeur, of the world, are a sweet and beneficent inducement to this belief, a constant fuel to our faith, so here we seek these arguments, not as dissatisfied with the one main ground [i.e., the conscience], not as *of little faith*, but because, believing it to be, it is natural we should expect to find traces of it. . . ."[94] And even more specifically: "That in its obvious sense and literal interpretation [nature] declares the being and attributes of the Almighty Father, none but the *fool in heart* has ever dared [say]. But it has been the music of gentle and pious minds in all ages, it is the *poetry* of all human nature, to read it likewise in a figurative sense, and to find therein correspondencies and symbols of the spiritual world." Coleridge was implying that perhaps the strongest evidence in support of Berkeley's interpretation is that it accords with a "universal persuasion": that, as he went on to say, mankind has agreed with Berkeley in regarding nature with "an awe, as if there were before [our] eyes the same Power, as that of the REASON — the same Power in a lower dignity, and therefore a symbol established in the truth of things." "It [has seemed] as if the soul said to herself: from this state hast *thou* fallen! Such shouldst thou still become . . .

[93] Anima Poetae (Boston, N.Y., 1895), p. 115.
[94] Literary Remains, I, 373.

— *that* must thou *make* thyself to *become*! "[95] Since Berkeley's logic will not satisfy the understanding, the problem, therefore, as Coleridge saw it, was to by-pass the understanding and present it only to the "feelings"; and Burke provided him with a solution to the problem. For, according to Burke, this is precisely what poetry does: it appeals so powerfully to the "feelings" that they completely fill the mind, suspending our reasonings altogether or sweeping them along by an irresistible force.

There is an additional reason for Coleridge's assigning the interpretation of nature to poets rather than philosophers. It seemed to him that the "ideas" or "spiritual objects" which are supposedly symbolized by nature are not capable of the kind of lucidity demanded by philosophy. They are and remain mysteries, and any attempt to clarify them can result only in misrepresenting and so destroying them. Poetry is capable of presenting them as mysteries, since the power of poetry lies in suggestion rather than stipulation. Behind Coleridge's thinking here is Burke's distinction between "a clear impression," which is demanded by the understanding, and "a strong impression," which is demanded by the arts. This fact is evident from his statement that "the grandest effects of poetry are where the imagination is called forth, not to produce a distinct form, but a strong working of the mind . . . ; the result being what the poet wishes to impress, namely, the substitution of a sublime feeling of the unimaginable for a mere image."[96] This "sublime feeling of the unimaginable," which is the very logic of poetry, is, of course, the terrible awe with which, according to Burke, human nature responds to mysteries.

But, if Burke persuaded Coleridge to modify Berkeley's point of view, Berkeley in turn persuaded him to modify Burke's. This is particularly clear in Coleridge's attitude toward "novelty," which Burke dismissed as "the most superficial of the affections." Coleridge agreed with Burke to the extent of "[excluding] from the list of worthy feelings, the pleasure derived from mere novelty in the reader";[97] but he refused to believe that there is anything contemptible about a "sense of novelty" with respect to nature.

[95] Statesman's Manual, pp. xiii–xiv.
[96] The Best of Coleridge, ed. Earl Leslie Griggs (N.Y., 1934), pp. 288–89.
[97] Biographia, I, 14.

It seemed to him, as it did to Berkeley, that, to anyone who can read its language, nature must always seem new and exciting. For this reason Coleridge was especially troubled by Burke's remarks about children. The child, he insisted, finds the world wonderful, not merely because it is new and his "senses are unworn and tender," as Burke suggested, but because he sees it in "the depth and height of the ideal world." [98] Of course the child has no "judgment" of the "understanding," but he has something far more precious: a "judgment" of the "reason." For, since he is still in a state of original innocence, he possesses only one faculty, the intuitive reason, but he possesses this faculty in a state of perfect development. To him, therefore, "the ideas of the Eternal, the Good, the True, the Holy, the Idea of God . . . as the Supreme spirit in which all these substantially *are*, and are ONE" [99] are the sole realities, and it is in the light of these realities that he views the whole of nature, the language of which is immediately intelligible to him. The tragedy is that, with the development of an understanding, he will fall from this "holy" state of "Infancy," [100] his faith in the intuitive reason will be weakened, and at last the truths of the ideal world will sink "*below* his own consciousness" and be "[known] to God alone." The consolation is that, perhaps because it is "pre-ordained" that a "few minds" should be spared for the purpose of "awakening others," [101] the fall is sometimes incomplete. For it occasionally happens that, even in maturity, a man may be capable of contemplating "all things with the freshness and wonder of a child; and, connecting with it the inquisitive power of riper years, [may add], as far as he can find knowledge, admiration; and, where knowledge no longer permits admiration, gladly [sink] back into the childlike feeling of devout wonder." [102] For Coleridge, such a man possesses "genius," the *sine qua non* of which is a child-like "sense of wonder and novelty." As he put it: "To carry on the feelings of childhood into the powers of Manhood, to combine the Child's sense

[98] Biographia, I, 59.
[99] On the Constitution of the Church and State (London, 1830), p. 144.
[100] Letters, II, 687.
[101] Anima Poetae, pp. 25, 244.
[102] Coleridge's Shakespearean Criticism, ed. Thomas Middleton Raysor (Cambridge, Mass., 1930), II, 148; Aids, pp. 228–29.

of wonder and novelty with the Appearances which every day for perhaps forty years had rendered familiar, . . . this is the character and privilege of Genius, and one of the marks which distinguish Genius from Talents. And so to represent familiar objects as to awaken the minds of others to a like freshness of sensation concerning them . . . — this is the prime merit of Genius, and its' [sic] most unequivocal mode of manifestation." [103]

Coleridge's remarks on the poetic imagination are little more than an explication of his remarks on "genius." He began by stipulating that, in general, "imagination" is only the power of creating experience, so that every act of perception is in effect an act of imagination. He then considered what precisely is involved in a child's perception. The child, he repeated, has only one faculty, the "reason," and the "ideas" or "spiritual Verities" which it creates are therefore the only "ideas" in the child's mind. To become aware of the world of nature, everyone must re-create it in terms which he can understand; and therefore the child must re-create it in terms of "ideas," that is, he must bring it under the forms of "spiritual Verities." Since he has no choice, the act is involuntary and unconscious; or, as Coleridge put it somewhat intricately, "In the original purity of a rational Agent the uncorrupted Will is identical with the Law. Nay, inasmuch as a Will perfectly identical with the Law is one with the *divine* Will, we may say that in the unfallen Agent the Will *constitutes* the Law." [104] But, as a result of the child's continued contact with the world, a second faculty, the "understanding," comes into existence, which has its own forms, namely, the forms of space and time and the categories. And, as the understanding develops, the child gradually transfers his faith to it, with the result that the "reason" is neglected and its "ideas" fade from consciousness, finally to be forgotten altogether. For the mature agent, therefore, the immediate act of perception is an imaginative re-creation of the world in terms intelligible to the "understanding." This is the only act of the adult imagination which is involuntary, and, in fact, it is the only act which is even possible for the great majority of adults. However, for the few who, having miraculously

[103] Friend, pp. 76–77; Friend (1818), III, 85; Biographia, I, 59–60.
[104] Aids, p. 295.

preserved some faith in the "reason," still retain some awareness of its "ideas," an additional act is possible: a deliberate re-perception of the world in terms of "ideas." This act is never involuntary; it always requires "reflexion, freedom, and choice." Also it is never entirely successful, the degree of success depending entirely on the degree of awareness of the "ideas." Coleridge explained what he had in mind in the form of a distinction between the "primary" and "secondary" imagination: "The primary IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the *kind* of its agency, and differing only in *degree*, and in the *mode* of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify." The "secondary imagination" is the poetic "imagination," and it is identical with the child's imagination except that it involves an act of will and it never entirely realizes its object, the "ideas" or eternal forms having lost their original vividness. Also, of course, the "secondary imagination" does not function immediately; according to Coleridge, it functions only as a process, which itself involves two steps. First, the poet must consult "his own spirit," which, having "the same ground with nature," teaches him "her unspoken language in its main radicals"; in this way be [acquires] . . . living and life-producing ideas, which shall contain their own evidence, the certainty that they are essentially one with the germinal causes in nature,—his consciousness being the focus and mirror of both." Second, he must re-perceive and re-create nature, bringing it as symbols under the forms of these "ideas." [105] Hence what Coleridge expected of the "secondary imagination" is precisely what Berkeley expected of philosophers — an interpretation of the language of nature.

God is the consummate artist, his imagination the absolute imagination, nature itself the sublimest poem. Knowing that man's faith, like "sublunary Fire, . . . needs the Fuel of con-

[105] Biographia, I, 202; II, 257, 258–59.

gruous, tho' perhaps perishable, notices to call it into actuality, and to maintain it in clearness," [106] God creates a nature, which being the perfect symbolic expression of his thoughts, affords men constant pleasure and instruction. The poet imitates God in every respect, but he would have no desire to equal him even if it were possible. For God is speaking to the mind "in its original purity," and his language, although intelligible to children, is too sublime for men in a state of corruption. Incapable of "[seeing] the thought which is present at once in the whole and in every part," [107] men see nature only as a manifold, its elements discordant and even contradictory. The poet's function, therefore, is to adapt nature to the "short sight" of men; or, as Coleridge said elsewhere, "The great artist does what nature would do, if only the disturbing forces [that is, human limitations and perversions] were abstracted." [108] His work is "just in proportion as it adequately conveys the thought, and rich in proportion to the variety of parts which it holds in unity." [109]

The intimate relation between poetry and religion is already evident. Both of them appeal to the "feelings"; both of them strive to "call . . . into actuality, and to maintain . . . in clearness" a faith in the intuitive reason. The chief difference between them is that religion uses as its "Fuel" The Bible; poetry uses that "other great Bible of God, the Book of Nature," endeavoring to make its meaning "transparent" by presenting it "as words, as symbols, valuable only as being the expression, an unrolled but yet glorious fragment, of the wisdom of the Supreme Being." [110] Religion, therefore, begins with the one or "idea" and finds in it the many; poetry begins with the many or nature and finds it a manifestation of the one. "Hence in all the ages and countries of civilization," Coleridge declared, "Religion has been the parent and fosterer of the Fine Arts, . . . the common essence of which consists in a similar union of the Universal and the Individual." [111] Nor, in Coleridge's opinion, "need [we] wonder that it has pleased

[106] Collected Letters, II, 1194.
[107] Biographia, II, 255.
[108] Unpublished Letters, II, 128, 153.
[109] Biographia, II, 255.
[110] Philosophical Lectures, p. 367.
[111] Statesman's Manual, pp. vi–vii.

Providence, that the divine truths of religion should have been revealed to us in the form of poetry; and that at all times poets . . . should have joined to support all those delicate sentiments of the heart . . . which may be called the feeding streams of religion. . . . [In] the strict sense of the word, an undevout poet is an impossibility." [112]

[112] Shakespearean Criticism, II, 148.

# THE TEXT OF ROMANS AND 1 CORINTHIANS IN MINUSCULE 93 AND THE TEXT OF PAMPHILUS *

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Greek manuscript II A 7 in the Biblioteca Nazionale in Naples is an unpublished minuscule codex from around the eleventh century containing the Acts of the Apostles, the Catholic epistles, fourteen epistles of St. Paul (including the Pastorals and Hebrews) and the Apocalypse through chapter three, verse thirteen. The codex was described in detail by Salvator Cyrillus, royal librarian of what was then the Bourbon Library, now the public library in Naples,[1] and more recently and briefly by Gregory [2] and von Soden.[3] The MS. is furnished with a form of the "Euthalian" apparatus including prologues; the Martyrium Pauli; tables of lections, Old Testament quotations, and chapter summaries. The codex also contains a colophon which states, among other things, that the MS. was written by Evagrius [4]

> ἀντεβλήθη δὲ ἡ βίβλος πρὸς τὸ ἐν Καισαρείᾳ ἀντίγραφον τῆς βιβλιοθήκης τοῦ ἁγίου Παμφίλου χειρὶ γεγραμμένον.

These facts connect 93 with several broader, interrelated questions. The "Euthalian" apparatus connects the MS. with the whole complex of questions surrounding Euthalius: who he was; when he lived; where he labored; and exactly what he, and what his

* This study is part of an investigation carried out through the assistance of a grant from the University of Pennsylvania.

[1] Codices Graeci MSS. Regiae Bibliothecae Borbonicae descripti atque illustrati, Naples, 1726, I, 13–24. I have not had access to this volume, but cite it from the only study on MS. II A 7 itself which has come to my attention, E. von Dobschütz, "A Hitherto Unpublished Prologue to the Acts of the Apostles (Probably by Theodore of Mopsuestia)," American Journal of Theology, II, 1898, 355.

[2] Textkritik des Neuen Testamentes, Leipzig, 1909, pp. 271, 299, 321. Gregory's numbers: 83 of the Acts and Catholic epistles, 93 of the epistles of Paul, 99 of the Apocalypse.

[3] Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments, Berlin, 1902, I. i, 224, 677 f. Soden's number, α200.

[4] Evagrius Ponticus, 346–399?. So Albert Ehrhard, "Der Codex H ad epistulas Pauli und 'Euthalios diaconos'," Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen, VIII, 1891, 409; J. A. Robinson, "Euthaliana," Texts and Studies, III, iii, Cambridge, 1895, p. 71. But cf. Dobschütz, "Ein Beitrag zur Euthaliusfrage," Centralblatt, X, 1893, 61 ff.

"successors," did.[5] The colophon itself raises a number of questions. Though similar colophons are found in a number of witnesses, that in the sixth-century Cod. Coislinianus[6] is identical with the colophon in 93 except for the "interpolation" of the Navigatio Pauli in the latter.[7] Was the colophon of 93 derived from that of Cod. H as their similarity and respective dates suggest? Does the text of 93, as well as its colophon, stem from Cod. H? The statement quoted from the colophon also connects 93 with the whole question of the Caesarean text-type, hitherto investigated for the most part in the gospels.[8] Zuntz has recently suggested that the Caesarean text-type in the epistles is properly a recension of Euthalius who he thinks may have been Euzoius, Bishop of Caesarea, 376–379.[9] In a similar manner our colophon connects 93 with the problem of the text of Pamphilus. A part of the evidence bearing on the relation of the text of 93 to the text of Pamphilus is the subject of the present study.

Pamphilus (240–309) was the successor and admirer of Origen

[5] Soden, Schriften, gives the Greek MSS. containing Euthalian material, I. 1, 674–679, as well as a discussion of the Euthalian question, 637–682. The Greek MSS. must be supplemented by reference to the Syriac (see esp. Dobschütz, "Euthaliusstudien," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, XIX, 1899, 115–154; Günther Zuntz, The Ancestry of the Harklean New Testament, The British Academy Supplemental Papers, No. VII, London, 1945, esp. pp. 77–121; "Études Harkléennes," Revue Biblique, LVII, 1950, 550–582; further n. 9); the Armenian (see F. C. Conybeare, "On the Codex Pamphili and Date of Euthalius," Journal of Philology, XXIII, 1895, 243 f., 249–252; cf. n. 28; "The Date of Euthalius," Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, V, 1904, 44–52); the Georgian (cf. K. Lake and S. New, The Text of the New Testament, 6th ed. rev., London, 1949, p. 60); and the Latin (Dobschütz, "Euthaliusstudien," 111). Further, the basic essay of L. A. Zacagni, Collectanea Monumentorum Veterum, Rome, 1698, pp. liv–lxxv, 401–708; reprinted in part by Migne, Patrol. Gr., LXXXV, 619–790, and elsewhere; (I am indebted to the courtesy of Professor William W. Manross, Librarian of the Philadelphia Divinity School, for generous access to the Zacagni volume); "Zacagni veröffentlichte den Apparat des Euthalius aus dieser Handschrift . . ." [minuscule 40 of Acts and Catholic epistles], Gregory, Textkritik, p. 267; cf. Dobschütz, "Euthaliusstudien," 108; Robinson, "Euthaliana," esp. pp. 1–27.

[6] M. H. Omont, Notice sur un très ancien manuscrit grec en onciales des Épîtres de Saint Paul, Paris, 1889, p. 53, cf. 56; also B. de Montfaucon, Bibliotheca Coislinliana, Paris, 1715, p. 262. H, $H^p$, $H_3$, 015; $\alpha$1022.

[7] This was noticed by Ehrhard, Centralblatt, VIII, 1891, 388 ff. The colophon of 93 is printed in part by Fabricius-Harless, Bibliotheca Graeca, ed. tertia, Hamburg, 1796, V, 789, § 223.

[8] See inter alia M.-J. Lagrange, Critique textuelle, Paris, 1935, II, 144–168.

[9] Günther Zuntz, "Die Subscriptionen der Syra Harclensis," Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, CI, 1951, 180 f.; The Text of the Epistles, (Schweich Lectures), London, 1953, pp. 153 ff.

(in Caesarea from 230 to 254), and wrote, perhaps along with Eusebius,[10] in his behalf an Apology (Ἀπολογία ὑπὲρ Ὠριγένους).[11] Pamphilus was also the predecessor and, for nearly fifty years, the contemporary of Eusebius (cir. 260–cir. 339); after Pamphilus' martyrdom under Maximus in 309, Eusebius took his name [12] and wrote his Life.[13] Pamphilus is perhaps best remembered for the library which he, building on the collection of Origen [14] and the resources of the library at Jerusalem,[15] assembled in Caesarea from all over the ancient world.[16] Some indication of the magnitude of this library may be gathered from the profuse references and quotations made by Eusebius in his Praeparatio Evangelica. As Jerome tells us,[17] and as notes and colophons attest,[18] Pamphilus was also active along with Eusebius, in copying and correcting biblical MSS. For example, such a note may be found at the end of the Epistle of Jeremy in the sixth-century MS. of the prophets, Cod. Marchalianus (Q), a part of which may be given here:

> Εὐσέβειος ἐγὼ τὰ σχόλια παρέθηκα· Πάμφιλος καὶ Εὐσέβειος διορθώσαντο.[19]

[10] Cf. O. Bardenhewer, Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur, 2te Aufl., Freiburg im Breisgau, 1914, II, 288–291.

[11] Only the first book survives in the Latin translation of Rufinus (d. 410); Migne, Patrol. Gr., XVII, 521–616.

[12] The meaning of Eusebius Pamphili, Εὐσέβιος Παμφίλου, ὁ τοῦ Παμφίλου is not known exactly. Eusebius has been supposed the friend (ἀναγκαῖος φίλος, necessarius, Jerome, Vir. Ill., 75; Migne, Patrol. Lat., XXIII, 721 f.), protégé, slave, spiritual son (usually), nephew (ὁ τούτου ἀδελφιδοῦς, Nicephorus Callistus [d. 1335], Hist. Eccl., VI. 37; Migne, Patrol. Gr., CXLV, 1204), and son of Pamphilus.

[13] In three books (cf. Mart. Pal., 11. 3; Schwartz, Eusebius Werke, GCS, II. ii, 934 f.; Jerome, Vir. Ill., 81; Migne, Patrol. Lat., XXIII, 725–728) a fragment of the third of which is given by Jerome, Adv. Rufin., I. 9; Migne, ibid., 422 f.

[14] Cf. Jerome, Vir. Ill., 113; Migne, Patrol. Lat., XXIII, 745 f.

[15] Eusebius, Hist. Eccl., VI. 20.

[16] Jerome, Epist. 34, Ad Marcellam; Migne, Patrol. Lat., XXII, 448.

[17] Adv. Rufin., II. 27; Migne, Patrol. Lat., XXIII, 471; "Mediae inter [Alexandria-Egypt/Constantinople] has provinciae Palaestinos codices [LXX] legunt, quos ab Origine elaboratos Eusebius et Pamphilus vulgaverunt."

[18] Harnack, Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur, Leipzig, 1893, I. 2, 543 f., lists and prints the text of several of these; see further the studies of Conybeare, Robinson, and Zuntz in ns. 5 and 9 for reference to the colophons in the Syriac and Armenian MSS. To Harnack's list must also be added the colophon of Cod. H, see n. 6, and that in minuscule 173. 211, α161, if Lietzmann is correct, An die Römer, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, VIII, Tübingen, 1928, p. 13.

[19] Iosepho Cozza-Luzi, Prophetarum: Codex Graecus Vaticanus 2125, Rome, 1890, p. 568.

Similar notes are also found at the end of Ezra and Esther in Cod. Sinaiticus (ℵ) from the fourth century. Here is a part of the subscription to Ezra:

> μετελήμφθη καὶ διορθώθη πρὸς τὰ Ἑξαπλᾶ Ὠριγένους· Ἀντωνῖνος ἀντέβαλεν· Πάμφιλος διόρθωσα.[20]

Notes in MSS. of the New Testament also state that they have been corrected to MSS. of Pamphilus; for example, the following subscription to Jude:

> ἀντεβλήθη δὲ τῶν Πράξεων καὶ Καθολικῶν ἐπιστολῶν τὸ βιβλίον πρὸς τὰ ἀκριβῆ ἀντίγραφα τῆς ἐν Καισαρείᾳ βιβλιοθήκης Εὐσεβίου καὶ Παμφίλου.[21]

Whether Pamphilus, with Origen or with Eusebius, made a recension of the New Testament or parts of the New Testament, as the colophons in the New Testament witnesses may be construed to imply and as Hug [22] and others have supposed,[23] has not been established.

What the text of the ἀντίγραφον[24] in the library of Pamphilus in Caesarea was, is not certainly known. Various witnesses have been advanced as representatives of the text of Pamphilus. As a result of his studies, Bousset [25] concluded that the text of Pamphilus is represented by the third corrector of Cod. Sinaiticus (ℵ$^{c}$), Cod. H, and the biblical text to be found in the Euthalian commentary comprising the upper writing of the palimpsest Codex rescriptus Porfirianus Chiovensis.[26] Conybeare believed the Cod.

[20] H. and K. Lake, Codex Sinaiticus, Oxford, 1922, p. 16.

[21] Harnack, op. cit., p. 544; Zacagni, Collectanea, p. 513, reads τοῦ παμφίλου.

[22] J. L. Hug, Einleitung in die Schriften des Neuen Testaments, 4te Aufl., Stuttgart, 1847, I, 171 ff.

[23] See ns. 25, 29, and 30; cf. L. Vaganay, Initiation à la critique textuelle néotestamentaire, Paris, 1934, pp. 96–98.

[24] ἀντίγραφα? cf. the subscription to Jude in the text.

[25] Wilhelm Bousset, "Der Kodex Pamphili," Texte und Untersuchungen XI. iv, Leipzig, 1894, p. 70 f. "Auch diese Thatsache erklärt sich am besten durch jene Erkenntnis einer von Pamphilus ausgegangenen Recension des neuen Testaments," p. 71. Cf. Theologische Literaturzeitung, XXV, 1900, 613, "Origenes hat keine Recension des neuen Testamentes hergestellt . . . ."

[26] P, P$_2$, 025, α3. The upper writing, 1834, α463 is cited by Tichendorf, Novum Testamentum Graece, ed. oct. crit. maior, Leipzig, 1872, as Euthal$^{cod}$.

Pamphili best evidenced in the Armenian version,[27] and the colophons connecting the Armenian text with that of Pamphilus make the matter worth further investigation despite the rejection of Conybeare's analysis by Robinson.[28] Cod. 1739 is connected, in part indirectly, with the text of Pamphilus according to von der Goltz.[29] The text of Pamphilus (and Eusebius) von Soden thought a Palestinian recension identical with his I (Ιερουσαλημ) — text.[30] The most important representatives of this text are the New Testament quotations of Eusebius [31] and the members of what he designated a sub-group $I^a$, led by, we may say, his $\alpha$1026 ($D^p$, 06), and $\alpha$1028 ($G^p$, 012), and including 93 ($\alpha$200) and other minuscules.[32]

Since the text of Pamphilus is unknown, it is impossible to proceed directly to a comparison of the text of 93 with it. What we rather possess is the testimony of a number of witnesses which, on one basis or another, may be supposed to represent the text of Pamphilus, among which witnesses is 93 itself. This situation apparently requires us to interrogate all of our Pamphilian witnesses especially with respect to their affinities with each other, and with supplementary witnesses. This analysis may enable us to form an answer to the question of which of our witnesses has a text most like what we should expect to have found in Caesarea in the first half of the fourth century. That is, what is the best witness to the text of Pamphilus. To state the problem in these terms is, of course, to lift into relief the fundamental rôle of the text of Eusebius and Origen, and it is not entirely clear why their testimony has not received the attention it deserves in this matter.[33] The present study has begun with a critical reconstruction of the text of Romans and 1 Corinthians as this is to be found

[27] Conybeare, Journal of Philology, XXIII, 1895, 258 f.

[28] Robinson, "Euthaliana," pp. 72–98. For reference to F. Macler's "detailed refutation" of Robinson's views, and a critique of Macler's method, see K. Lake, R. P. Blake and S. New, "The Caesarean Text of the Gospel of Mark," Harvard Theological Review, XXI, 1928, 307–310.

[29] E. F. von der Goltz, "Eine textkritische Arbeit des zehnten bezw. sechsten Jahrhunderts," Texte und Untersuchungen, N. F. II. iv, Leipzig, 1899, esp. pp. 16, 23.

[30] Soden, Schriften, I. ii, 1907, 1506; I. iii, 1910, 2177.

[31] I. iii, 1951 f.

[32] I. iii, 1936–47.

[33] Cf. Eberhard Nestle, Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the Greek New Testament, trans. from the 2nd ed. by William Edie, London, 1901, p. 188.

in Eusebius' quotations in the Demonstratio Evangelica; [34] almost all of his New Testament quotations other than those from the gospels in that work are from these books. With this text has then been collated six of our witnesses thought to give the text of Pamphilus: D, ℵ$^{c}$, G, 1739, 1834, and 93, and other supplementary witnesses.[35] The collations for Romans and for 1 Corinthians are given in Tables I and II. The testimony of the Armenian is not included; the fragmentary nature of Cod. H[36] and the random character of Eusebius' quotations combine to deprive us of the testimony of this important witness. Some orthographic variants have been included and most of the variants have less significance for any alteration of sense than for the relations of the texts. Where a witness is not cited in Tables I and II, a lacuna is to be assumed.[37]

TABLE I. — READINGS FROM ROMANS

i. 1–3 (Heikel, p. 337, l. 18)

3 93 το κατα σαρκα] om το Dem ℵABKP1739TR

[34] Cf. H. S. Murphy, "Eusebius' New Testament Text in the Demonstratio Evangelica," Journal of Biblical Literature, LXXIII, 1954, 166.

[35] The readings of 93 are from photographs of the MS. made available to me through the courtesy of the Biblioteca Nazionale in Naples. The other witnesses are cited from the following editions:

Dem, Demonstratio Evangelica, Heikel, GCS, Leipzig, 1913;

P$^{46}$, Chester Beatty Bibl. Papy., Kenyon, London, 1936–7;

ℵ, ℵ$^{c}$, (01, δ2), Sinaiticus, Tischendorf, Leipzig, 1865;

A(02, δ4), Alexandrinus, Woide and Cowper, London, 1860;

B(03, δ1), Vaticanus, Bibliorum S. S. Graecorum Codex Vat. 1209, Milan, 1904–7;

C(04, δ3), Ephraemi, Tischendorf, Leipzig, 1834;

D(D$^{p}$, D$_{2}$, 06, α1026), Claromontanus, Tischendorf, Leipzig, 1852;

G(G$^{p}$, G$_{3}$, 012, α1028), Boernerianus, C. F. Matthaei, Messina, 1791;

K(K$_{2}$, 018, I$^{1}$, Aπρl), Mosquensis, Mattaei, Riga 1872, 1873;

P(P$^{2}$, 025, α3), Porfirianus, Tischendorf, Monumenta Sacra Inedita, Nova Collectio, V, Leipzig, 1865;

1739 (α278), M. S. Enslin, Six Collations of New Testament Manuscripts, ed. by K. Lake and S. New, Cambridge, Mass., 1932;

1834(Euthal$^{cod}$, α463), see n. 26;

TR, Textus Receptus, Oxford, 1873; a reprint of J. Mill's Nov. Test. Gr., Oxford, 1707, the text of which is that of Stephanus' editio regia of 1550.

[36] See Omont, n. 6; in addition, K. Lake, Facsimiles of the Athos Fragments of the Codex H of the Pauline Epistles, Oxford, 1905, and Robinson, "Euthaliana," pp. 50–65.

[37] Lacunae in Romans: P$^{46}$, i. 1 — v. 17, xi. 2–3; C, i. 1–3, ii. 5 — iii. 21, ix. 5 — x. 15; D, i. 1–3; G, i. 1–5; K, x. 18 to end; P, ii. 15 — iii. 5. Lacunae in 1 Corinthians: P$^{46}$, i. 23; A, xv. 55; C, vii. 18 — ix. 6; K, i. 1 — vi. 13; 93, i. 23, εθνεσι/ελλησι is obscure.

i. 16–17 (371, 31)
16 93 Dem ℵABCDKP1739TR εις σωτηριαν] om G
93 Dem ABCDKP1739TR Ιουδαιω τε] Ιουδε ℵ
93 Dem ℵACDKP1739TR πρωτον] om BG
17 93 Dem ℵBCDGKP1739TR δικαιοσυνη γαρ] δικ. δε A
i. 20 (161, 26)
93 Dem ℵABCDKP1739TR αορατα] ορατα G
i. 21 (163, 31) (350, 17)
93 Dem ℵABCKP1739TR αυτων καρδια] καρδια αυτων DG
i. 22–23 (163, 31)
23 93 K ηλλαξαντο] ηλλαξαν Dem ℵABCDGP1739TR
93 και πετεινων και ερπετων και τετραποδων]
και πετ. om K
και πετ. και τετρα. και ερπετ. Dem ℵABCDGP1739TR
ii. 2 (371, 8)
93 Dem ABDGKP1739TR οιδαμεν δε] οιδαμεν γαρ ℵC
ii. 28–29 (345, 20)
28 93 Dem ℵABDK1739TR εν τω φανερω] εν εν τω φανερω G
29 93 Dem ℵABDK1739TR εν πνευματι] ος πνευματι G
93 Dem ℵABDK1739TR του θεου] om του G
iii. 29–30 (371, 24) iii. 30 (256, 30)
30 93 Dem ℵ$^{c}$DGKPTR επειπερ] ειπερ ℵABC1739
93 Dem ℵABCGKP1739TR ο θεος] om ο D
ix. 27 (79, 25) ix. 27–29 (68, 33)[38] ix. 27–29 (70, 36)[39] ix. 29 (276, 30)
27 93 P$^{46}$DGKPTR καταλειμμα] υπολειμμα[40] Dem ℵAB1739
28 93 ℵ$^{c}$DGKP1834TR[41] εν δικαιοσυνη οτι λογον συντετμημενον] om Dem P$^{46}$ℵAB1739
93 Dem P$^{46}$ℵADGKP1739TR κυριος] ο κυριος B
29 93 Dem ABDKP1739TR εγκατελιπεν] ενκατελιπεν P$^{16}$ℵG
93 P$^{46}$AGP1834 ομοιωθημεν] ωμοιωθημεν Dem ℵBDK1739TR
xi. 1–5 (69, 4)[42] (71, 6)[43] xi. 5 (276, 29) (313, 20)

[38] For κραζει (70, 36), (68, 33) reads κραυγαζει, sg. rd.
[39] ix. 29. (70, 36) reads προειρηκεν, but (68, 33) reads προειπεν, sg. rd.
[40] (68, 33), (70, 36) read υπολειμμα; (79, 25) καταλειμμα; cf. Isaiah x. 22, LXX, καταλ(ε)ιμμα. υπολειμμα may be a scribal correction in 1739.
[41] (70, 36) omits εν δικαιοσυνη οτι λογον συντετμημενον, but (68, 33) has οτι λογον συντετμημενον: cf. Isaiah x. 22, LXX, εν δικαιοσυνη οτι λογον συντετμημενον.
[42] xi. 2. (69, 4) reads του Ισραηλ with all witnesses, but (71, 6) τον Ισραηλ, sg. rd.; (71, 6) reads κατα with all witnesses, (69, 4) περι, sg. rd.
[43] xi. 3. (69, 4) reads την ψυχην μου with all witnesses, but (71, 6) μου την ψυχην, sg. rd.; cf. 1 Kings xix. 10, 14, LXX reading both. (69, 4) and (71, 6)

1 93 Dem ℵABCDP1739TR *τον λαον*] *την κληρονομιαν* $P^{46}$ G
93 Dem ℵBCGP1739 1834TR *αυτου*] *αυτου*] *ον προεγνω* $P^{46}$ $\aleph^c$AD
2 93 ℵTR *λεγων*] om Dem $\aleph^c$ABCDGP1739
3 93 $\aleph^c$ D1834TR *και τα θυσιαστηρια*] om *και* Dem ℵABCGP1739
4 93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABCDP1739TR *τη βααλ*] *τω βααλ* G
5 93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDGP1739TR *ουν*] om C
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABCGP1739TR *εκλογην*] *εκλογης* D

A collation of our fourteen witnesses with eighteen definite quotations of Eusebius from Romans yields twenty-seven variant readings. The agreement with each other of each of our seven proposed witnesses to the text of Pamphilus may be read from Table I. These witnesses are Eusebius, $\aleph^c$, D, G, 1739, 1834 and 93. They apparently fall into two groups. The first, composed of $\aleph^c$, D, G, 1834, and 93, shows moderate internal agreement, moderate agreement with B, ℵ, A and C, and its members are medieval in date. There are two exceptions to this statement: $\aleph^c$ is always with D, and 1834 is always with 93. However, in our readings from Romans $\aleph^c$ only occurs five times and 1834, four. In the second group are the readings of Eusebius and 1739. These witnesses are in complete agreement with each other except for one reading, and are in high agreement with B, ℵ, A, and C. In the case of the Demonstratio, both Eusebius and his text are fourth-century; in the case of 1739 the text is fourth-century, but the MS. is tenth. Here there are two questions: Why does the tenth-century 1739 have in Romans a fourth-century text, and why is 1739 virtually identical with Eusebius' text of Romans in the Demonstratio? Thanks to the labors of von der Goltz and Kim an answer to both questions is at hand. Scribal notes in 1739 indicate that the fifth-century compiler of the archetype from which 1739 was copied reconstructed the text of Romans, except in chapter nine,[44] from the lemmata of Origen's commentary on that book.[45] Kim's comparison of some forty verses from

read *του λαβειν αυτην*, sg. rd., with 1 Kings xix. 10 and 14, LXX. xi. 4. (71, 6) reads *λεγει αυτω* with all witnesses, but (69, 4) omits *αυτω*, sg. rd.

[44] *τομος* IA′ *ος ου φερεται*. Goltz, "Eine textkritische Arbeit," p. 58.

[45] Of the original fifteen books of the Greek Commentary, only fragments survive: in the Philocalia, in the Catenae, in St. Basil, and on papyrus; for details see

Romans, which Origen cites in his Commentary on Matthew, with the text of Romans in 1739 revealed that the two texts are identical.[46] These forty verses do not, of course, show that all of Origen's text of Romans is identical with 1739, but it establishes a presumption in favor of very high agreement between the two texts. Further, there remains to be integrated with this picture the text of the quotations from Romans which Origen made in his other works.[47] However, the agreement that we have between 1739 and the quotations from Romans in the Demonstratio is a fact, a fact admitting of a simple interpretation, both texts reproduce the text of Origen. This indicates a similar text of Romans for both the predecessor and successor of Pamphilus; how probable is it that the text of Pamphilus would have been very different? As far as can be judged from the evidence presently under consideration, it appears that Eusebius, and 1739, afford us the most reliable indication of Pamphilus' text of Romans.

If this is indeed the case, it does not look as though the text of 93 has been corrected against that of Pamphilus. In this respect 1739 forms an instructive comparison and control. 93 is from around the eleventh century, and 1739, from about the tenth. Both MSS. purport to have been adjusted to earlier models. The degree of affinity with earlier texts both MSS. lead us to expect is borne out in 1739; in 93 it is not. Aside from the four instances of 1834, 93 finds its highest agreement with the tenth-century K. As a matter of fact nine of our fourteen witnesses read with Eusebius (and 1739) more frequently than 93.

The Textus Receptus plays an interesting rôle in our readings from Romans. In view of the respective dates of Eusebius and the Textus Receptus, the high agreement of the latter with the former, amounting to twenty-three readings in twenty-seven, is surprising. This high agreement does not obtain in our readings from 1 Corinthians. Further, in Romans, twelve of our eighteen quotations from the Demonstratio are in exact agreement with

Johannes Quasten, Patrology, Utrecht, 1953, II, 49 f. Rufinus' Latin translation is given by Migne, Patrol. Gr., XIV, 833–1292.

[46] K. W. Kim, "Codices, 1582, 1739, and Origen," Journal of Biblical Literature, LXIX, 1950, 168.

[47] Cf. O Bauernfeind, "Der Römerbrieftext des Origenes nach dem Codex von der Goltz," Texte und Untersuchungen, III. xiv, Leipzig, 1924, 1–119, esp. 90–119.

the received text. This result makes analysis of Eusebius' four variants from the Textus Receptus rather meaningless. The question is, is Eusebius' text late, or is that of the Textus Receptus early? Has the text of Eusebius been "corrected" to a standard similar to the Textus Receptus,[48] or since we have no indication of "correction" of the Textus Receptus, does it simply preserve in the text under consideration old readings? The latter alternative appears preferable. Eusebius' quotations from 1 Corinthians evidence no "correction"; why should his quotations from Romans have been singled out for such treatment? Since Eusebius and 1739 have such high agreement, are we to suppose that both have been "corrected" in the exact same manner? Further, if the Textus Receptus reads with Eusebius' twenty-seven readings in twenty-three cases, B reads with Eusebius in twenty-four; are we to think that B has also been "corrected" to the received text? All this seems less likely than that the Textus Receptus simply preserves in our readings an ancient text. That the Textus Receptus preserves old readings has never really been doubted, but the indiscriminate preference for those readings which depart from the Byzantine text ought to be.

TABLE II. — READINGS FROM 1 CORINTHIANS

i. 10 (83, 1)
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABCDP1739TR *εν τη αυτη*] om *εν* G

i. 23 (480, 32)
Dem ℵABCDGP *εθνεσι*] *ελλησι* 1739 1834TR

i. 30 (371, 11) (371, 21)
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABCDGP1739 *σοφια ημιν*]*ημιν σοφια* TR
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABCPTR *δικαιοσυνη τε*] om *τε* D
*και δικαιοσυνη* G1739

ii. 9 (213, 2)
93 *οιδεν*]*ειδεν* Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDG1739TR *ιδεν* CP

vii. 29–35 (40, 33)
29 93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABKP1739TR *ο καιρος*] *οτι ο καιρος* DG
93 (G) KTR *το λοιπον εστιν*] *εστιν το λοιπον* Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDP 1739 1834

[48] The principal MS. of the Demonstratio is the twelfth-century Paris. 469 (P); Heikel, Demonstratio Evangelica, pp. ix ff.; Harnack, Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur, I. ii, p. 568.

93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDGP1739TR *μη εχοντες*] *μη οι εχοντες* K
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDKP1739TR *ωσιν*] om G
30 93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDKP1739TR *κλαιοντες . . . κλαιοντες*]
*κλεθοντες . . . κλεθ.* G
93 Dem ℵABDGKP1739TR *και οι χαιροντες*] om *και* $P^{46}$
31 93 Dem $ℵ^{c}$KP1834TR *τω κοσμω τουτω*]
*τον κοσμον* $P^{46}$ℵAB
*τον κοσμον τουτον* DG1739
32 93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDKP1739TR *θελω δε*] om *δε* G
93 KP1739 1834TR *αρεσει*] *αρεση* Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDG
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDKP1739TR *κυριω*] *θεω* G
33 93 KP1739 1834TR *αρεσει*] *αρεση* Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDG
34 93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDP1739 1834 *και μεμεριστται*] om *και* GKTR
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABGKP1739 1834 *και η γυνη*] om *και* DTR
93 DGKTR *η γυνη*] *η γυνη η αγαμος* Dem $P^{46}$ℵABP1739
93 $P^{46}$ℵADGK1739TR *παρθενος η αγαμος*] om *η αγαμος* Dem
BP
93 Dem ℵBGKP1739TR *αγια και*] om *και* $P^{46}$AD
93 DGKTR *σωματι και πνευματι*] *τω σωμ. και τω πνευμ.*
Dem $P^{46}$ℵABP1739 1834
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵADGKP1739TR *τα του κοσμου*] om B
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDG *αρεση*] *αρεσει* KP1739 1834TR
35 93 Dem $ℵ^{c}$GKP1739 1834TR *συμφερον*] *συμφορον* $P^{46}$ℵABD
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABDGP1739 *ευπαρεδρον*] *ευπροσεδρον* KTR

ix. 9–10 (78, 1) (311, 25) (314, 8)
93 DG *περι των βοων*] om *περι* Dem $P^{46}$ℵABCKP1739TR

ix. 10 (78, 1) (314, 8) [49]
93 Dem $P^{46}$ℵABCP1739 1834 *οφειλει επ ελπιδι ο αροτριων*]
*οφειλει ο εφ ελπιδει αροτριων οφειλει* G
*ο εφ ελπιδι αροτριων οφειλει* D
*επ ελπιδι οφειλει ο αροτριων* $ℵ^{c}$KTR
93 $ℵ^{c}$KTR *της ελπιδος αυτου μετεχειν επ ελπιδι*]
*της ελπιδος αυτου μετεχειν* DG
*επ ελπιδι του μετεχειν* Dem $P^{46}$ℵABCP1739 1834

xv. 55–56 (169, 34)
55 93 $ℵ^{c}$DGKPTR *κεντρον . . . νικος*] *νικος . . . κεντρον*
Dem $P^{46}$ℵBC1739 1834
93 $ℵ^{c}$KP1834TR *αδη*] *θανατε* Dem $P^{46}$ℵBCDG1739
56 93 $P^{46}$ℵBCDGKP1739TR *η αμαρτια*] *εστιν η αμαρ.* Dem A

[49] (314, 8) reads *οφειλει ο αροτριων επ ελπιδι*, sg. rd.

There are fewer quotations from 1 Corinthians in the Demonstratio, ten, than from Romans, but the variant readings deriving from collation of these quotations with our other witnesses are more numerous, thirty-two. Twenty-one of these readings are from one long quotation of vii. 29–35. The agreement among our seven witnesses to the text of Pamphilus may be read from Table II. ℵ$^{c}$ is present in six of these readings, and 1834 in fourteen. C is only present in eleven. Our seven witnesses exhibit in only two cases rather strong agreement with each other: 1834–1739 and ℵ$^{c}$–93. As in Romans, there is a rather sharp break here between the readings of Eusebius and the rest of the Pamphilian witnesses. The readings from the Demonstratio find their strongest support from P$^{46}$, B, ℵ, and A. Our other Pamphilian witnesses do not enjoy this accord with the ancient texts. Eusebius differs from B and ℵ in but four readings in thirty-two. 1739 does not instance the high agreement in 1 Corinthians which it does in Romans, but high agreement between 1739 and Eusebius is not expected in 1 Corinthians, since the archetype here was created on a different basis.[50] Eusebius is supported most highly in both Romans and 1 Corinthians by B. It is difficult to resist the suspicion that Eusebius is in the readings under consideration our most reliable index to the text of Pamphilus. The resemblance between the text of Eusebius and that of 93 is relatively low. Eight of our fourteen witnesses read with Eusebius more frequently than 93. 93 has low support from P$^{46}$, B, ℵ, and A; 93 is most frequently attested by the TR, P, K, and ℵ$^{c}$. A collation of 93 and Eusebius in the present readings from 1 Corinthians shows twelve instances in which 93 departs from Eusebius. In one of these twelve 93 stands alone; in ten of the remaining eleven readings 93 is with the Textus Receptus and K. This suggests not only that the text of 93 is medieval, but also that 93 has little more claim to have been "corrected" to the text of Pamphilus than other medieval texts which possess no colophon.

If the Demonstratio's text of Romans and 1 Corinthians enjoys preference by reason of its locality, date, and kind of text (B) as the best of our present representatives to the text of Pamphilus, 93 has not apparently been "corrected" to it. The remaining ques-

[50] Cf. Goltz, "Eine textkritische Arbeit," p. 9.

tion is how the colophon of 93 is to be understood. We may suppose that the colophon of 93 was simply copied from another MS. the text of which was corrected to the text of Pamphilus, but the text of 93 was not. This may be the case. Colophons and other matter were transposed in this manner; Cod. H, for example, has a colophon like 93, but apparently a text like Eusebius.[51] Or we may suppose that the text of 93 was corrected against a text of Pamphilus different from that of Eusebius. It seems unlikely that a text comparable to that of the later Pamphilian witnesses or to a Pamphilian-Euthalian witness such as 93 would represent the text of Pamphilus himself. A "revised" form of the text of Pamphilus, made or utilized by Euthalius, would, however, comport with activity of Euthalius in Caesarea [52] and with the Pamphilian colophon. How much homogeneity of text exists among the witnesses having the Euthalian materials is yet to be established; that is, whether there was an Euthalian text.[53] Much work remains to be done.

[51] "Le text [of Cod. H] appartient au type B. . . ," Lagrange, Critique textuelle, II, 467.

[52] Cf. Robinson, "Euthaliana," pp. 34–36; Zuntz, Revue Biblique, LVII, 1950, 552–555.

[53] According to Conybeare, Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, V, 1904, 43, P. Corssen did not find any affinity of textual tradition among MSS. of the eighth to the eleventh centuries which contain the Euthalian apparatus; Gött. gel. Anz., 1899, No. 9.

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